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I.  INTRODUCTION
The Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected deci-
sions handed down in 2000 by the Alaska Supreme Court, the
Alaska Court of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska.  The
summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed, the
statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence of
each of the holdings.  Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the
information contained in this review without further reference to
the cases cited.  Please note that memorandum decisions and un-
published opinions are not included in The Year in Review.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than the nature of the underlying claims.  The sum-
maries are presented alphabetically in the following ten areas of
the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional,
criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, and tort.
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Akiak Native Community v. United States Postal Service,1
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Postal Service.2  The
plaintiffs, several Alaska Native communities, sued the U.S. Postal
Service, arguing that the latter’s plan to serve the communities by
hovercraft rather than by aircraft violated both the Coastal Zone
Management Act (“CZMA”) and the National Environmental
Copyright © 2001 by The Alaska Law Review.  The Year in Review is also avail-
able on the Internet at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/18ALRYearinReview.
1. 213 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2000).
2. See id. at 1148.
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Policy Act (“NEPA”).3  Under CZMA, any development projects
in a coastal zone must be consistent “to the maximum extent prac-
ticable” with approved state management programs.4  The U.S.
Postal Service provided a “consistency determination” to the State,
which granted its approval.5  The court found that plaintiffs’ rea-
sons to enjoin the hovercraft project were not compelling.6  The
plaintiffs also argued that the U.S. Postal Service’s Environmental
Assessment, required under NEPA, failed to assess adequately the
risks of, or the alternatives to, the hovercraft plan.7  The court
found these claims unwarranted, holding that the Environmental
Assessment met all of the criteria required by NEPA, and thus af-
firmed the district court’s summary judgment.8
In State v. Kalve,9 the court of appeals held that the Federal
Submerged Lands Act works as a concurrent regulation with state
regulations and does not grant exclusive federal control.10  The
court reversed the superior court’s decision to dismiss claims
against the defendant, Kalve, a fisherman charged with illegally
fishing in closed state waters.11  Kalve was provided a federal li-
cense that enabled him to fish in certain state waters.12  By emer-
gency regulation, the State of Alaska prohibited certain types of
fishing in state waters and Kalve subsequently was cited for fishing
in these waters.13  The district court granted Kalve’s motion to dis-
miss on the grounds that the “paramountcy doctrine” grants fed-
eral supremacy in state waters.14  The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the paramountcy doctrine does not apply since the
Federal Submerged Lands Act gives states control over certain ter-
ritorial waters and “the authority to regulate natural resources
within those waters.”15  Additionally, the federal regulations were
“not intended to supplant applicable state regulations.”16
3. See id. at 1143.
4. Id. at 1144.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1145-46.
8. See id. at 1148.
9. 9 P.3d 291 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
10. See id. at 294.
11. See id. at 292.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 294.
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In American International Group v. Uallen Carriere,17 the su-
preme court held that Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(f) “im-
poses a continuing duty to satisfy the fourteen-day requirement
with tender of a negotiable instrument.”18  Carriere had requested a
stop payment on a workers’ compensation check underwritten by
American International Group (“AIG”).19  When AIG failed to
send a replacement check within fourteen days, Carriere filed a
claim for a twenty-five percent late payment penalty under Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.155(f).20  The Alaska Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board denied his claim because the initial check had been
mailed on time.21  The superior court reversed the agency’s deci-
sion.22  On appeal, the supreme court upheld the superior court’s
decision, holding that, by requesting a stop payment on the initial
check, Carriere had reinstated the fourteen-day obligation.23  Fur-
ther, the statute does not allow discretion for mailing the payment
within a “commercially reasonable” time.24
In City of St. Mary’s v. St. Mary’s Native Corp.,25 the supreme
court held that a city council could repeal an exemption to a voter-
approved sales tax without resubmitting the repeal to public vote.26
Voters in the City of St. Mary’s passed a ballot measure in 1986 to
levy a three percent sales tax.27  St. Mary’s city council implemented
the voter-approved sales tax, but limited application of the three
percent tax to the first $1000 of each sales transaction.28  In 1994,
the council moved to repeal the exemption and held public hear-
ings after posting notice in various local establishments.29  The re-
peal ordinance passed over the objections of the defendants,
Alaska Commercial Company (“ACC”) and St. Mary’s Native
Corporation (“SMNC”), who later refused to pay the excess tax.30
The supreme court, overturning summary judgment to ACC and
SMNC, held that the repeal did not require submission for public
vote because the ordinance neither increased “the rate of levy” of a
17. 2 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2000).
18. Id. at 1223 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155(f) (LEXIS 2000)).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1225.
24. Id.
25. 9 P.3d 1002 (Alaska 2000).
26. See id. at 1004.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1004-05.
30. See id. at 1005.
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sales tax nor created a “new” sales tax under Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 29.45.670.31  The court held that a genuine issue of fact existed
as to whether giving notice of the council meeting in the Tundra
Drums newspaper would have satisfied Alaska Statutes section
29.45.670’s mandatory requirement that local governments publish
notice in a newspaper of general circulation if such a newspaper
exists in a community.32
In Department of Commerce and Economic Development v.
Schnell,33 the supreme court reversed the superior court’s ruling
that estopped the Division of Insurance (the “Division”) from sus-
pending or conditioning Schnell’s insurance agent license, and or-
dered the Division to reconsider its sanctions decision on remand.34
In 1992, Schnell was convicted of felony false declaration in con-
nection with his 1987 petition for personal bankruptcy.35  In an at-
tempt to revoke Schnell’s insurance agent license, the Division
conducted a hearing in 1993 on the matter, but rejected the hearing
officer’s proposed sanctions.36  Schnell’s license was renewed until
1995, when a new Division director issued a final decision on the
matter and suspended Schnell’s license for six months.37  On ap-
peal, the superior court held that the State was estopped from sanc-
tioning Schnell.38  The supreme court reversed the superior court,
because the Division never asserted, by its conduct or words, that
the matter was resolved; therefore, the Division was not estopped
from sanctioning Schnell.39  In addition, the doctrine of laches did
not bar the State’s action because laches does not bar claims caused
by adjudicatory delay.40  However, because Schnell did not have an
opportunity to present evidence of his post-1992 conduct, the court
remanded and instructed the Division to consider current evidence
in sanctioning Schnell.41
In Department of Public Safety v. Shakespeare,42 the supreme
court held that the Department of Public Safety could not revoke
an arrestee’s driver’s license for her initial refusal to take a breath
31. Id. at 1008 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.670 (LEXIS 2000)).
32. See id. at 1011-12.
33. 8 P.3d 351 (Alaska 2000).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 354.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 354-55.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 358.
40. See id. at 359.
41. See id. at 360.
42. 4 P.3d 322 (Alaska 2000).
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test when she subsequently changed her mind and the test was ad-
ministered.43  Shakespeare was arrested for driving while intoxi-
cated (“DWI”) and was taken to the local state trooper detach-
ment for a breath test.44  She refused to take the breath test and was
notified that the Department of Public Safety, under Alaska’s im-
plied consent statutes,45 would revoke her license administratively
as a consequence.46  Shortly after surrendering her license, Shake-
speare changed her mind.47  Although the police permitted Shake-
speare to take a breath test and obtained potentially probative re-
sults, the Department of Public Safety revoked Shakespeare’s
license administratively based on her initial refusal to take a breath
test.48  The supreme court held that it would be “unfair and incon-
sistent” to revoke her driver’s license when she “cured” her prior
refusal by submitting to the test.49
In Department of Revenue v. DynCorp,50 the supreme court
held that the Office of Tax Appeals erred when it relieved Dyn-
Corp from the penalty assessed by the Department of Revenue for
failing to file timely amended state tax returns.51  Under Alaska
Statutes section 43.20.030(d), DynCorp was required to notify the
Department of Revenue of any tax adjustments made pursuant to
an IRS audit and pay the additional taxes within sixty days after
the IRS issued its final decision.52  Citing a large workload and in-
sufficient personnel, DynCorp did not file its notice within the
sixty-day deadline.53  As a result, the Department of Revenue lev-
ied a penalty against DynCorp, which DynCorp appealed to the
Office of Tax Appeals.54  The Office of Tax Appeals found that
DynCorp’s failure to pay the additional taxes within the statutory
period was due to a reasonable cause.55  Although the supreme
court held that the Office of Tax Appeals can exercise its inde-
pendent judgment when reviewing appeals, it held that the Office
of Tax Appeals erred when it found that DynCorp’s failure to
comply with the law was due to a reasonable cause and not willful
43. See id. at 326.
44. See id. at 323.
45. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031(a) (LEXIS 2000).
46. See Shakespeare, 4 P.3d at 324.
47. See id.
48. See id
49. Id. at 325-26.
50. 14 P.3d 981 (Alaska 2000).
51. See id. at 989.
52. See id. at 982.
53. See id. at 983.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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neglect.56  To have reasonable cause for noncompliance, the tax-
payer must show that it exercised ordinary business care and pru-
dence.57  The court held that DynCorp did not exercise ordinary
business care and prudence because its failure to file was caused by
circumstances under its control, such as the failure to use its re-
sources efficiently.58  Therefore, the court reversed the decision of
the Office of Tax Appeals and reinstated the penalty.59
In Gwich’in Steering Committee v. Office of the Governor,60 the
supreme court held that documents from the Governor’s Office
relating to lobbying efforts regarding drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge (“ANWR”) were protected as predecisional and
deliberative.61  The Gwich’in Steering Committee is a nonprofit or-
ganization with interests in protecting ANWR from oil exploration
and drilling.62  The Gwich’in Steering Committee requested docu-
ments from the Governor’s Office relating to ANWR.63  The Gov-
ernor’s Office provided some, but not all, of the desired materials
and claimed that the withheld materials were protected by the pre-
decisional deliberative process privilege.64  The court noted that
public officials may claim the privilege when disclosure would
hamper the “open exchange of opinions and recommendations be-
tween government officials.”65  A predecisional communication is
one that was made before the deliberative process is finished.66  A
document must also be deliberative to qualify as privileged.67  The
court noted that a deliberative document reflects “the ‘give-and-
take’ of the decisionmaking process and contains opinions, recom-
mendations, or advice about agency policies.”68  Once a document
meets both of the above prongs, the burden switches to the party
desiring disclosure to show that the benefits of disclosure outweigh
the government’s interest in protecting the document.69  The su-
preme court held that the privilege protects “any government deci-
sionmaking function, including the governor’s policymaking and
56. See id. at 985, 989.
57. See id. at 985-86.
58. See id. at 987.
59. See id. at 989.
60. 10 P.3d 572 (Alaska 2000).
61. See id. at 585-86.
62. See id. at 576.
63. See id. at 576-77.
64. See id. at 577.
65. Id. at 578.
66. See id. at 579.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
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lobbying of either state or federal government.”70  Finally, the su-
preme court vacated a portion of the superior court’s ruling which
ordered Gwich’in to pay attorney’s fees to the Governor’s Office.71
In In re Johnstone,72 the supreme court affirmed the Alaska
Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation that former
Superior Court Judge Karl Johnstone should be publicly repri-
manded for creating an appearance of impropriety.73  Johnstone
was responsible for appointing a coroner for Alaska’s Third Judi-
cial District.74  Initially, he asked the court administrator to begin
the recruitment process, which has several formal procedural re-
quirements.75  However, after the recruitment process had been
substantially completed, Chief Justice Daniel Moore recommended
a personal friend of his, Richard McVeigh, for the job.76  Even
though McVeigh did not submit a formal application and the inter-
viewing committee did not rank him highly compared to other can-
didates, Johnstone appointed McVeigh on a temporary basis.77  Af-
ter a complaint was filed, the Alaska Commission on Judicial
Conduct “found the evidence insufficient to establish actual im-
propriety but sufficient to support the conclusion that Judge
Johnstone had created an appearance of impropriety in hiring
McVeigh.”78  Applying Alaska Statutes section 22.30.080(2), the
court determined that the commission had jurisdiction over
Johnstone, even though Johnstone subsequently retired, because
he was an active judge both when the alleged impropriety occurred
and when the commission began the investigation.79  The court af-
firmed the commission’s finding that Johnstone created an appear-
ance of impropriety and accepted the recommendation that a pub-
lic reprimand be issued.80
In Jerrel v. Department of Natural Resources,81 the supreme
court held that the Department of Natural Resources (the “De-
partment”) was not estopped from enforcing a regulation that it
had never previously enforced;82 however, the requirement that
70. Id. at 583-84.
71. See id. at 585-86.
72. 2 P.3d 1226 (Alaska 2000).
73. See id. at 1228.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1229.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1230.
79. See id. at 1231-32.
80. See id. at 1238.
81. 999 P.2d 138 (Alaska 2000).
82. See id. at 142.
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livestock markings be visible was not adopted in accordance with
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and thus was not a
valid regulation.83  Dan and Viola Jerrel had a lease with the State
of Alaska to ranch their horses.84  The Jerrels’ neighbors com-
plained that loose horses were damaging property, yet the belief
that the damage was caused by the Jerrels’ horses could not be sub-
stantiated because the Jerrels’ horses were not marked.85  The De-
partment informed the Jerrels of the requirement under Alaska
Administrative Code title 11, section 60.070 that livestock be
marked, and the Department also informed them that such mark-
ings must be visible from twenty feet away.86  The court found that
the Department could not be estopped from enforcing the Alaska
marking requirement even though it had not previously enforced
the requirement.87  However, the court did not allow the Depart-
ment to enforce the twenty foot visibility requirement of such
markings.88  Although the Department claimed the requirement
was “an informal ‘policy rule’ rather than a regulation,”89 the court
disagreed and held the regulation invalid since it was not adopted
through the proper procedural standards set forth in the APA.90
In Kachemak Bay Conservation Society v. Department of
Natural Resources,91 the supreme court affirmed the Department of
Natural Resources’ (the “Department”) decision to approve a gas
and oil lease program.92  In 1996, the State offered to lease over one
million acres of state-owned land for petroleum exploration and
development.93  The Department determined that the sale was in
the best interests of the State and that the sale was consistent with
the Alaska Coastal Management Plan.94  Kachemak Bay challenged
both of these determinations and further argued that the Depart-
ment impermissibly “phased” its review (i.e., divided its proposal
into discrete parts, such as exploration, construction, and produc-
tion).95 Kachemak Bay unsuccessfully moved for an injunction
83. See id. at 139.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 140.
87. See id. at 142.
88. See id. at 146.
89. Id. at 143.
90. See id. at 144.
91. 6 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2000).
92. See id. at 294.
93. See id. at 274.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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against the lease sale, which took place in December 1996.96  In
January 1998, the superior court upheld the Department’s best in-
terests finding and its conclusive consistency determination.97  The
supreme court held that the Department was expressly permitted
to “phase” its review of a proposed disposition of land by Alaska
Statutes section 38.05.035.98 The court further affirmed the De-
partment’s best interests finding, concluding that the Department
had a reasonable basis for its decision.99  The supreme court also
held that the Department took the requisite “hard look” at the
situation and was reasonable in concluding that the proposed lease
sale was consistent with the habitats standard.100
In Native Village of Eklutna v. Board of Adjustment for the
Municipality of Anchorage,101 the supreme court vacated the supe-
rior court’s affirmation of a permit for a granite mining operation
that would destroy a culturally significant hill and remanded for
consideration of the cultural impact of the mining.102  The court
found that a five-page report, based primarily upon a walking sur-
vey, did not provide substantial evidence to determine that the
quarry would not affect cultural resources.103  Further, other evi-
dence in the record, including testimony that the village of Eklutna
is named for two granite hills, one of which was slated for mining,
established that some cultural resources would certainly be ad-
versely affected by the quarry.104  Therefore, the court held that on
remand, the extent of such adverse effects should be determined
and considered in light of the goals of preserving historic and ar-
chaeological resources.105
In Ninilchik Traditional Council v. United States,106 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part the Federal Subsistence Board’s (the “Board”) decision to im-
pose a spike-fork/fifty-inch antler restriction on subsistence uses of
moose in Game Management Unit (“GMU”) 15 located on the
Kenai Peninsula.107  The federal government is charged with regu-
96. See id. at 275.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 279 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.035 (LEXIS 2000)).
99. See id. at 286.
100. See id. at 288.
101. 995 P.2d 641 (Alaska 2000).
102. See id. at 645.
103. See id. at 644-45.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 645.
106. 227 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000).
107. See id. at 1189.
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lating subsistence hunting use priority, and the Federal Subsistence
Board determined subsistence hunting should be permitted in
GMU 15, with a spike-fork/fifty-inch antler restriction on moose.108
Ninilchik argued this restriction violated the provision in 16 U.S.C.
§ 3114 giving priority to subsistence hunters.109  The court upheld
the Board’s decision, which accorded subsistence hunters priority,
but not absolute priority, over non-subsistence uses.110  Further-
more, the court found the priority afforded by the Board to subsis-
tence hunters was indeed meaningful as it “was necessary to ‘pro-
tect the continued viability’ of the moose population as required
under section 3114.”111  However, the court then determined the
Board erred in concluding that a two-day hunting period reserved
for subsistence users gave adequate “priority” to subsistence users
within the meaning of the statute, as this period was shortened to
allow for a non-subsistence bow-and-arrow hunt.112
In O’Callaghan v. Sweat,113 the supreme court validated a pol-
icy set by the Commissioner of Fish and Game permitting salmon
roe stripping for certain overstocked species.114  Mike O’Callaghan,
an officer of the non-profit organization EARTH, contested that
roe stripping, or removing eggs from salmon and discarding the
flesh, violated Alaska Statutes section 16.05.831, which prohibits
the waste of salmon.115  The court held that the legislature dele-
gated sufficient authority to the Commissioner to promulgate
regulations.116  Furthermore, since there was a surplus of salmon
that were subject to roe stripping, the regulation was consistent
with the salmon waste law.117
In Office of Public Advocacy v. Superior Court,118 the supreme
court held that Alaska Criminal Rule 39(e)(2)(B) and Alaska Ad-
ministrative Rule 12 allowed the trial court discretion to craft a
remedy to reimburse the state for the services of the Office of Pub-
lic Advocacy (“OPA”) counsel.119  A father was appointed counsel
from the OPA, and was later found to exceed the maximum in-
108. See id. at 1189-90.
109. See id. at 1193.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 1194.
112. See id. at 1195-96.
113. 996 P.2d 88 (Alaska 2000).
114. See id. at 91.
115. See id. at 93.
116. See id. at 96.
117. See id. at 98.
118. 3 P.3d 932 (Alaska 2000).
119. See id. at 934.
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come level allowed for the service to be paid for by the State.120
The trial court ordered the father to reimburse the State for the
costs of the representation at a rate of $100 per hour plus the law-
yer’s airfare and hotel expenses.121  The supreme court held that
Criminal Rule 39(e) applied: the court could either terminate the
legal services or continue the services and recapture the costs.122
In Said v. Eddy,123 the district court dismissed Said’s complaint
for declaratory and injunctive relief from removal proceedings by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”).124  Said was
born in Yemen and brought to the United States by her father.125
Said was convicted of an aggravated felony and, as an alleged alien,
the INS began removal proceedings.126  During those proceedings,
Said and the INS entered into a stipulation providing that the INS
would stay her removal if she would not appeal the proceeding.127
The INS then moved to dismiss Said’s previous complaint for de-
claratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the issue was
moot as a result of the stipulation.128  Said argued that she could
maintain her complaint under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).129  However, be-
cause no department, agency, or official denied her claim that she
was a United States citizen, the court found that she was not enti-
tled to declaratory relief under § 1503.130  In addition, § 1503 does
not apply to persons within the United States where the issue of
citizenship arose in connection with any removal proceeding.131
In Schikora v. Department of Revenue,132 the supreme court
found that, under former Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095(8) and
Alaska Administrative Code title 15, section 23.163, when a State
resident is absent from the State for more than 180 days in any
year, that person does not meet the residency requirement for re-
ceiving permanent fund dividends even when, at the time of the
application, the resident is present in the State.133  The supreme
court upheld the superior court’s decision not to allow Schikora to
120. See id. at 933.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 934-35.
123. 87 F. Supp. 2d. 937 (D. Alaska 2000).
124. See id. at 944.
125. See id. at 937.
126. See id. at 938.
127. See id. at 939.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 940 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1503(1994)).
130. See id.
131. See id. at 941.
132. 7 P.3d 938 (Alaska 2000).
133. See id. at 939.
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receive permanent fund dividends for years in which his absence
from Alaska exceeded 180 days.134  Schikora argued that, because
he was a State resident present in Alaska at the time when he had
applied for his dividends, he should have received the dividends
under former Alaska Statutes section 43.23.095(8).135  Alaska Stat-
utes section 43.23.095(8) made a person eligible to receive divi-
dends if “on the date of application the individual is a state resi-
dent.”136  Schikora claimed that he had been a State resident since
1945 and thus should receive the dividends because he was in
Alaska at the time of application.137  The supreme court held, how-
ever, that “[s]ince Schikora was not physically present for the en-
tire qualifying period for any of his permanent fund dividend appli-
cations in question . . . he must account for his absences.”138
Because Schikora’s absences for business, leisure, and unsubstanti-
ated medical care did not satisfy the statute, he could not receive
the dividend.139  Further, the supreme court found that the perma-
nent fund dividend regulations did not deny Schikora due process
of law or equal protection and did not interfere with interstate
commerce.140
In Skvorc II v. Personnel Board,141 the supreme court re-
manded to the superior court the issue of whether lack of notice
was prejudicial to Skvorc, but affirmed the superior court’s finding
that the Alaska Personnel Board could recommend Skvorc’s ter-
mination of employment.142  Skvorc worked for the Alaska De-
partment of Fish and Game (the “Department”) when he was ac-
cused of twenty-three violations of the Alaska Executive Branch
Ethics Act.143  Skvorc started his own company in order to develop
a fisheries management tool and then used government funds to
solicit business for this company without notifying the Depart-
ment.144  Skvorc argued that the initial complaint’s failure to state
three of the twenty-three allegations violated his procedural due
process rights for two reasons: inadequate notice and inability to
134. See id.
135. See id. at 940 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8) (LEXIS 2000)).
136. Id. at 942.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 943.
139. See id. at 942.
140. See id. at 944-46.
141. 996 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 2000).
142. See id. at 1195.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1195-96.
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respond.145  The supreme court stated that “it is not necessary to
serve an amended complaint charging all counts later charged in
the accusation.”146  However, the court found that one of the
twenty-three allegations did not give Skvorc adequate notice be-
cause the amended complaint omitted the specific incidences of
misuse with which he was eventually charged.147  The court then
remanded for determination whether the omission had been preju-
dicial to Skvorc.148
In Stosh’s Inspection and Maintenance v. Fairbanks North Star
Borough,149 the supreme court upheld the decision of the Fairbanks
North Star Borough Pollution Control Commission (“PCC”) to
suspend  Stoshu Solski’s license to perform emissions inspections.150
Because Solski had five prior violations detected through covert
audits, the court held that PCC followed procedure in selecting
Solski for an audit under the “as needed” language of the program
procedures.151  In addition, the lack of an auditor training program
did not make the audit defective.152  The goals of a training pro-
gram, primarily that a tester be familiar with and adhere to PCC
procedures and state regulations, had been met.153
In United Parcel Service Co. v. Department of Revenue,154 the
supreme court held that all jet fuel purchased at the pump in
Alaska and used for domestic flights originating from Alaska was
taxable under Alaska Statutes section 43.40.010(b).155  United Par-
cel Service Co. (“UPS”) made bulk purchases of jet fuel in An-
chorage between December 1991 and March 1993.156  Since UPS
used some of the jet fuel for direct flights to foreign countries, it
was exempt from paying tax directly upon purchase under Alaska
Statutes section 43.40.020(b).157  Accordingly, UPS contended it was
subject to tax as “a user” under section 43.40.010(b), not as “a pur-
chaser,” and that, “as a user, it should pay only for the actual fuel
‘consumed’ by its domestic flights within Alaska.”158  Rejecting this
145. See id. at 1195, 1197.
146. Id. at 1205.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1195, 1207.
149. 12 P.3d 1180 (Alaska 2000).
150. See id. at 1181.
151. See id. at 1184-85.
152. See id. at 1185.
153. See id. at 1185-86.
154. 1 P.3d 83 (Alaska 2000).
155. See id. at 89-90 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 43.40.010(b) (LEXIS 2000)).
156. See id. at 84.
157. See id. at 87.
158. Id.
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theory, the supreme court found that the legislative history inferred
an intent to “subject purchasers and users to equivalent motor fuel
taxes.”159  Furthermore, the supreme court found that “since con-
sumption is commonly . . . measured at the pump,” there is no rea-
son to assume “that the legislature intended to adopt a less com-
mon and less sensible measure—moment of actual combustion.”160
In United States v. Ertsgaard,161 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the Individual Fishing Quota (“IFQ”)
regulations for halibut do not constitute a fishery management plan
under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.162  In 1998, Ertsgaard was in-
dicted for two violations of the Lacey Act, including the submission
of a false IFQ landing report and the harvesting, transmission, and
sale of 11,000 pounds of halibut in excess of his quota.163  Ertsgaard
claimed his alleged violations fell within one of the exceptions to
the Lacey Act, and that the activity was regulated by a fishery
management plan under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.164  The court
held that, although the regulations were created by the Northern
Pacific Fishery Management Council, an organization that was it-
self created by the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the regulations were
promulgated under the authority of the Halibut Act and subject to
the Lacey Act’s provisions.165
III.  BUSINESS LAW
In American Computer Institute, Inc. v. State,166 the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s order that a school which had
closed during mid-term must refund tuition to students who could
not complete the course of study, but reversed the superior court’s
reduction in prejudgment interest and remanded the case for entry
of an order requiring the school to pay the statutorily set interest
rate.167  American Computer Institute (“ACI”), a postsecondary
school providing vocational programs, closed its campuses in Fair-
banks and Anchorage without prior notice to students.168  ACI of-
fered alternative programs which would enable the students to
159. Id. at 88.
160. Id.
161. 222 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000).
162. See id. at 618.
163. See id. at 615.
164. See id. at 616.
165. See id. at 617.
166. 995 P.2d 647 (Alaska 2000).
167. See id. at 656-57.
168. See id. at 649.
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complete the term.169  Nevertheless, some students at each campus
were not able to complete their instruction.170  On August 19, 1997,
the Alaska Commission on Postsecondary Education, acting on
behalf of these students, filed a request for an injunction requiring
ACI to provide the programs for which the students had paid tui-
tion, or to reimburse the students.171  The superior court held that
ACI had a contractual obligation to its students and that ACI’s al-
ternative measures did not limit its liability to its students.172  The
superior court ordered ACI to refund the tuition of the students,
but reduced the rate of prejudgment interest to the respective in-
terest rates paid by each student.173  The supreme court affirmed
the order requiring ACI to reimburse the students, but held that
the superior court erred in reducing the prejudgment interest.  The
supreme court reversed and remanded for entry of an order re-
quiring ACI to pay the interest rate specified in Alaska Statutes
section 09.30.070(a), which sets the interest rate on judgments.174
In In re Bonham,175 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a bankruptcy court may order substantive consolidation
of non-debtor corporations nunc pro tunc.176  Bonham operated a
Ponzi scheme through two corporations, of which she was sole
shareholder and director.177  Involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings were ultimately instituted against Bonham.178  The
Chapter 7 trustee filed a motion for substantive consolidation nunc
pro tunc of the two corporations with Bonham’s estate after inves-
tors in the Ponzi scheme challenged the trustee’s standing to avoid
transfers by the corporations.179  The bankruptcy court granted the
motion and the investors appealed.180  The court first held that the
order of the bankruptcy court was final and appealable because
substantive consolidation affects substantive rights of involved par-
ties.181  The court then adopted the substantive consolidation test
utilized by the Second Circuit: “(1) whether creditors dealt with the
entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on their separate
169. See id. at 650.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 651.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. 229 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2000).
176. See id. at 771.
177. See id. at 759.
178. See id. at 761-62.
179. See id. at 766.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 761-62.
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identity in extending credit; or (2) whether the affairs of the debtor
are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.”182
The presence of either factor alone is sufficient, and both factors
were present here.183  Once this test is met, the court leaves the dis-
cretion whether consolidation nunc pro tunc is appropriate to the
bankruptcy court.184  Such power “should be sparingly used and
must be tailored to meet the needs of each particular case.”185
In Standifer v. State,186 the supreme court held that a district
court should have determined whether the petitioner’s student loan
should have been discharged due to undue hardship.187  Standifer
obtained a student loan from the State of Alaska.188  Standifer later
filed for bankruptcy and was granted a discharge of his listed
debts.189  The state advised Standifer that his student loan was not
dischargeable and brought suit.190  A default judgment was entered
against him.191  The district court denied Standifer’s Civil Rule
60(b) motion to vacate the default judgment, and the superior
court affirmed the district court’s ruling.192  The supreme court held
that under 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1), a debtor’s defense of bankruptcy
discharge cannot be waived for any reason.193  The bankruptcy dis-
charge relieved the petitioner from defending himself as a debtor
in a subsequent action.194  The court reversed the district and supe-
rior courts’ judgments and remanded the case to the district court
to determine the dischargeability of Standifer’s student loan under
the federal bankruptcy act’s undue hardship provisions.195
182. Id. at 766.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 771.
185. Id.
186. 3 P.3d 925 (Alaska 2000).
187. See id. at 926.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 927
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 929.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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IV.  CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
In Sanders v. Barth,196 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s denial of Civil Rule 82 attorney’s fees despite finding error
in the superior court’s application of the divorce rule exception.197
Sanders claimed attorney’s fees because she had prevailed in a
child support proceeding that occurred ten years after the end of
the relationship between herself and defendant Barth.198  The supe-
rior court held that in divorce-type proceedings, attorney’s fees are
awarded based on the economic positions of the parties, but Sand-
ers had not sought such fees.199  On appeal, the supreme court rec-
ognized that this child support proceeding, taking place years after
the end of the relationship, did not resemble a divorce proceeding
and thus could not fall under the divorce exception.200  However,
because the settlement agreement between the parties did not con-
template the payment of attorney’s fees and no evidence proved
that Barth knew that attorney’s fees were an issue, the superior
court’s application of the divorce rule exception was harmless er-
ror.201
B. Damages
In Alaska General Alarm, Inc. v. Grinnell,202 the supreme court
held that the statute of limitations for tort actions did not apply to
claims for equitable apportionment.203  In 1993, the plaintiffs sued
Grinnell Corporation after suffering injuries from a discharge of
halon from a fire protection system while technicians from Grinnell
Corporation and Alaska General Alarm were examining the sys-
tem.204  In 1996, Grinnell answered the plaintiffs’ complaint and
filed a third-party complaint against Alaska General Alarm.205
Grinnell claimed that Alaska General Alarm was responsible in
whole or in part for plaintiffs’ injuries.206  Alaska General Alarm
answered and filed a motion for partial summary judgment, argu-
196. 12 P.3d 766 (Alaska 2000).
197. See id. at 767.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 767-68.
200. See id. at 768.
201. See id. at 769.
202. 1 P.3d 98 (Alaska 2000).
203. See id. at 99.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 99-100.
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ing that the statute of limitations barred the third-party complaint
because it was filed more than two years after the initial incident.207
The superior court denied the motion.208  The supreme court held
that Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080’s express language and leg-
islative history did not require that defendants file third-party
claims for apportionment within the statute of limitations govern-
ing the plaintiffs’ underlying claim.209  Otherwise, the court would
undermine the statute’s purpose of apportioning liability equitably
among at-fault parties.210  The court also found that third parties
must be joined in order to allocate fault and liability.211
In Chilton-Wren v. Olds,212 the supreme court held that a forci-
ble entry and detainer (“FED”) action deals exclusively with pos-
session and that, in the absence of explicit waiver, raising counter-
claims during a FED action does not preclude a party from
preserving litigation of claims for damages in a jury trial.213  After a
FED action was decided in favor of Janice Chilton-Wren, she
sought a jury trial on her five counterclaims and an additional civil
rights claim.214  The district court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of Wallace Olds, Chilton-Wren’s landlord, on the basis of col-
lateral estoppel.215  The court also held that Chilton-Wren had
waived her right to a jury trial.216  The supreme court reversed,
holding that under Civil Rule 38(a), the importance of a jury trial
requires an explicit waiver of rights.217  The court also found that
collateral estoppel did not apply to such counterclaims.218  The
court reasoned that “[a] tenant should not be forced to choose be-
tween being evicted from her home but preserving her right to seek
monetary damages or retaining possession of her home but for-
feiting recovery of her damages claims.”219
In Dobos v. Swartout,220 an appeal from a lower court decision
in which a taxi driver was found liable for hitting a pedestrian, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the
207. See id. at 100.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 102 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (LEXIS 2000)).
210. See id. at 104.
211. See id.
212. 1 P.3d 693 (Alaska 2000).
213. See id. at 698.
214. See id. at 696.
215. See id. at 694.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 696.
218. See id. at 698.
219. Id.
220. 9 P.3d 1020 (Alaska 2000).
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statement of the taxi passenger under the present sense impression
exception to the hearsay rule, and affirmed the lower court’s denial
of Dobos’ motion for a directed verdict.221  The court held that any
error that the trial court may have made in admitting the testimony
of the passenger under the hearsay exception was harmless because
the statement played a very small role in the trial, and other evi-
dence was strong enough for the jury to have reached the same
conclusion without it.222  The court held that the motion for a di-
rected verdict was properly denied because there was a triable is-
sue of fact as to Dobos’ negligence.223  Because Dobos reasonably
could believe that he was not negligent, the supreme court affirmed
the lower court decision not to award attorney’s fees under Alaska
Civil Rule 37(c)(2) for Dobos’ failure to admit negligence and cau-
sation.224  However, the court held that fees should have been
granted to the plaintiff for Dobos’ failure to agree to the admissi-
bility of certain medical records.225
In Griffith v. Taylor,226 the supreme court affirmed a jury’s
finding that legal malpractice was not the legal cause of Ned
Griffith’s damages.227  The court held that the lower court did not
err in precluding certain expert testimony that was offered six years
after the suit was filed, and Griffith did not attempt to modify the
pretrial order.228  In addition, a jury instruction about superseding
causation was appropriate because reasonable minds could differ
over whether damages were caused by the firm’s negligence or sub-
sequent forgery by Griffith’s father.229  Finally, the court held that
Griffith waived his right to challenge the jury verdict on jury poll-
ing grounds because his attorney told the court he was satisfied
with the polling of the jury.230
In Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,231
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s refusal to set aside punitive damages verdicts in the Exxon
Valdez oil spill litigation because of alleged irregularities during
221. See id. at 1020-22.
222. See id. at 1025.
223. See id. at 1025, 1028.
224. See id. at 1020, 1026.
225. See id. at 1020, 1027.
226. 12 P.3d 1163 (Alaska 2000).
227. See id. at 1169.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 1167-68.
230. See id. at 1168-69.
231. 206 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2000).
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jury deliberations.232  Defendant Exxon had filed a motion for a
new trial on the basis of several incidents: a remark made by the
bailiff to another juror about putting emotionally distraught Juror
A “out of her misery,” an alleged threat to Juror A to put her in
jail if she refused to deliberate, and alleged threats to Juror A’s
daughters.233  The appeals court ruled that it was not abuse of dis-
cretion for the district court to find no actual prejudice from the
bailiff’s remark, because it was interpreted as a tasteless joke and
not heard by Juror A.234  It was also not clearly erroneous for the
district court to doubt Juror A’s credibility regarding the threats.235
Juror A had not reported the threats until years after the trial, ex-
plaining that she had forgotten them, and testified for the first time
to numerous threats to her own life made during deliberations.236
This implausible testimony and her extremely distraught condition
during and after the trial made it likely, the district court found,
that her memory of the events was distorted.237
C. Miscellaneous
In Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., v. Kritz,238 the su-
preme court affirmed the denial of permissive intervention to U.S.
English, Inc., and reversed the denial of intervention for Alaskans
for a Common Language, Inc., in an action to determine the consti-
tutionality of a successful ballot initiative requiring the Alaska gov-
ernment to use English as its official language.  Alaskans for a
Common Language sponsored the initiative.239  Noting that initia-
tive committee members have a constitutionally based, heightened
interest in a lawsuit to determine whether the successful initiative
will be enforced and a legal obligation to represent initiative spon-
sors in all related matters, the court found these interests met the
criteria for intervention as of right under Alaska Civil Rule 24(a).240
To determine whether Alaskans for a Common Language had
standing to represent the initiative sponsors, the court adopted the
U.S. Supreme Court’s test: an association has standing to bring suit
on behalf of its members when (1) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to
232. See id. at 903.
233. Id. at 904-05.
234. See id. at 906-07.
235. See id. at 913.
236. See id. at 908-12.
237. See id. at 912-13.
238. 3 P.3d 906 (Alaska 2000).
239. See id. at 914.
240. See id. at 912-14.
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protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (3) neither
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participa-
tion of individual members in the lawsuit.241  The supreme court
held that Alaskans for a Common Language, which was formed for
the sole purpose of sponsoring the ballot initiative, met this test
and thus had associational standing to represent the initiative spon-
sors.242  The supreme court further held that U.S. English lacked a
direct interest and failed to raise any new issues in the current leg-
islation that would justify an intervention as a matter of right.243
In Barrett v. Era Aviation, Inc.,244 the supreme court held that
two jury instructions with potentially conflicting definitions of neg-
ligence constituted reversible error and remanded the case for a
new trial.245  Mickey Barrett was a passenger on an Era Aviation
flight.246  He later filed suit against Era claiming that damage to his
inner ear resulted from negligent maintenance of the plane’s pres-
surization system.247  Barrett hired an expert, who was not licensed
as a mechanic, to testify about the plane’s pressurization system.248
The court ruled that Barrett’s expert was competent because the
standard for experts is “whether the jury can receive appreciable
help from this particular person on this particular subject.”249  The
court, however, did not remand on those grounds, but instead
found that the failure to correct the jury instructions was a legal er-
ror.250  The judge had included two instructions on negligence: one
relating to general negligence and one relating to the negligence
standard of a common carrier.251  The supreme court reasoned that
once Era was found within the ambit of a common carrier, the
higher standard of care—the utmost duty of care—was applica-
ble.252
In Bauman v. Commissioner,253 the district court granted the
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) motion to dismiss the com-
241. See id. at 915 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432
U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
242. See id. at 915-16.
243. See id. at 916.
244. 996 P.2d 101 (Alaska 2000).
245. See id. at 102.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 103.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 105.
251. See id. at 104.
252. See id.
253. No. A99-0491-CV(HRH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2424, at *1 (D. Alaska
Jan. 31, 2000).
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plaint of taxpayers who were audited by the IRS and contested the
resulting adjustments to their tax returns.254  The tax court sent the
decisions on the Baumans’ cases to their attorney, but the attorney
never notified the Baumans.255  The Baumans filed a cause of action
in district court arguing that the tax court decisions were wrong and
that they were entitled to a new hearing because they did not re-
ceive timely notice of the decisions.256  In response to the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss, the Baumans argued that res judicata
does not apply to the tax court decisions because they were denied
due process.257  However, because plaintiffs’ counsel received the
tax court’s decisions and the plaintiffs could have appealed, the
court held that there was no lack of due process and applied the
doctrine of res judicata.258  The court dismissed the Baumans’
claim.259
In Copper River School District v. Traw,260 the supreme court
reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and remanded for fur-
ther proceeding.261  The Copper Valley School Board passed a mo-
tion to offer retirement incentives to teachers with seniority, but
administrators later discovered that they had miscalculated the fi-
nancial effect of the incentives.262  Before the Board could meet
again and rescind the motion, six teachers “accepted” the retire-
ment plan.263  When the school district refused to pay the teachers
the amount specified in the motion, the teachers sued for breach of
contract, and the trial court granted the teachers’ motion for sum-
mary judgment.264  On appeal, the school district argued that the
motion was not an “offer” and, even if it was an offer, the district
administrators’ communications effectively terminated the teach-
ers’ power of acceptance.265  The supreme court found that it was
unclear whether the school board’s motion constituted an “offer,”
and that this is therefore a matter to be determined by a finder of
fact.266  The court further held that the district administrators’
communications (telling the teachers that they couldn’t accept the
254. See id. at *1-2, 10.
255. See id. at *2-3.
256. See id. at *4-5.
257. See id. at *6.
258. See id. at *8.
259. See id. at *10.
260. 9 P.3d 280 (Alaska 2000).
261. See id. at 288.
262. See id. at 281.
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 282.
266. See id. at 286.
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motion and not to accept it) did not necessarily revoke any offer,
but that this, too, was a matter for the fact finder.267  Since issues of
material fact remained, the supreme court held that summary
judgment was improperly granted, and reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.268
In Harpole v. United States,269 the district court dismissed Har-
pole’s petition seeking to vacate prior tax court orders and sanc-
tions, and to permanently enjoin that judge from exercising any
further jurisdiction over this tax case.270  The judge had declared
Harpole’s brief to be frivolous and levied $20,000 in sanctions after
Harpole continued to advance those arguments.271  Harpole’s peti-
tion to the district court sought equitable relief and named as de-
fendants the Tax Court, the judge in his tax case, and the United
States.272  The district court held that Harpole offered no authority
that the Tax Court could be sued and dismissed the petition as to
that defendant.273  The United States was also dismissed as a defen-
dant because no executive agency action was involved to trigger a
waiver of sovereign immunity.274  The tax court judge was dismissed
as a defendant because as a federal judicial officer, she is immune
from suits involving declaratory and injunctive relief.275  Finally, the
court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Har-
pole’s petition because the petition was simply an appeal of his Tax
Court case and all issues would be addressed on direct appeal from
that court.276
In Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.,277 the supreme court
held that the superior court improperly dismissed a suit arising out
of tort and contract claims.278  The superior court dismissed on
three grounds: (1) as a sanction for violations of discovery; (2) be-
cause of issue preclusion; and (3) on the merits of the case.279  The
litigation entailed a joint venture fish processing facility that had
been abandoned in 1974, leading to at least five lawsuits.280  The
267. See id. at 287.
268. See id. at 288.
269. 206 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2000).
270. See id. at 907.
271. See id. at 904.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 905-06.
274. See id. at 906.
275. See id. at 907.
276. See id. at 906-07.
277. 12 P.3d 1169 (Alaska 2000).
278. See id. at 1171-72.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 1172.
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court held that before litigation-ending sanctions are imposed for
discovery violations, the superior court must examine alternative
lesser sanctions.281  The case should not have been dismissed for is-
sue preclusion because the interests of the plaintiffs were not
aligned with those of the party in the earlier litigation.282  Finally,
summary judgment should not have been granted because the de-
fendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that plaintiff’s
case was without merit.283  The order of dismissal was therefore va-
cated.284
In MacDonald v. State,285 the court of appeals held that an in-
dividual could be prosecuted for violating a domestic violence pro-
tective order under Alaska Statutes section 11.56.740(a) without
being formally served with a written copy of the order, as long as
the defendant had actual knowledge of the protective order.286
MacDonald was charged with five counts of violating a domestic
violence protective order.287  He filed a motion in district court to
dismiss the charges against him, claiming that the court lacked ju-
risdiction over him because he had not been formally served with a
written copy of the order in accordance with Alaska Civil Rule 4.288
After finding that MacDonald had actual knowledge of the domes-
tic violence protective order at the time the violations occurred, the
district court denied MacDonald’s motion to dismiss.289  Mac-
Donald subsequently pled no contest and was found guilty of one
count of violating a domestic violence protective order in each of
two separate cases.290  The court of appeals upheld MacDonald’s
conviction, holding that actual notice is all that is required in a
criminal contempt proceeding for a defendant to be bound by a
court order.291
In Martinez v. Ha,292 the supreme court affirmed a grant of
summary judgment to the defendant in a medical malpractice
case.293  Martinez failed to disclose a list of experts and did not re-
spond to an order to show cause or to Dr. Ha’s motion for sum-
281. See id. at 1176.
282. See id. at 1177-78.
283. See id. at 1179.
284. See id. at 1180.
285. 997 P.2d 1187 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
286. See id. at 1189.
287. See id. at 1188.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 1189.
292. 12 P.3d 1159 (Alaska 2000).
293. See id.
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mary judgment.294  Without expert testimony or other evidence op-
posing Dr. Ha’s expert report concluding there was no evidence of
malpractice, the trial court determined that a prima facie case
could not be established.295  Because no admissible evidence was
presented by Martinez until after summary judgment had been
granted in favor of Ha, summary judgment for Ha was affirmed.296
In Odom v. Fairbanks Memorial Hospital,297 the supreme court
held that the superior court erred in dismissing eight out of eleven
claims for relief against Fairbanks Memorial Hospital (“FMH”)
arising out of the termination of Odom’s staff privileges.298  FMH
employed Odom as an anesthesiologist from 1988 through 1994.299
Odom told FMH that he wanted to open an outpatient surgery cen-
ter in 1992.300  In 1994, after a Special Investigative Committee’s in-
vestigation of quality assurance issues involving Odom, the FMH
Executive Committee recommended that he lose temporarily his
staff privileges at FMH unless he agreed to practice medicine un-
der supervision there or completed further training.301  While Odom
was in a formal retraining program, FMH terminated his staff
membership and clinical privileges.302  Odom argued that his inten-
tion to compete with FMH led to the quality assurance investiga-
tion, and the information in FMH’s report to a national reporting
system was false.303
Odom alleged eleven claims of relief in his suit against FMH
and other health care providers, all of which were dismissed for
failure to state a claim.304  The supreme court reversed the dismissal
of eight claims, holding that a complaint should be construed liber-
ally and deemed sufficient if evidence may emerge that supports a
grant of relief to the plaintiff.305  The court held that Odom’s com-
plaint alleged facts which, if proven, would be enough to state a
claim for unreasonable restraint of trade, group boycott, attempted
monopolization, defamation, breach of oral contract, unfair trade
294. See id. at 1161.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 1162-63.
297. 999 P.2d 123 (Alaska 2000).
298. See id. at 127.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 127-28.
304. See id.
305. See id.
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practices, interference with a prospective economic advantage, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.306
In Silvers v. Silvers,307 the supreme court held it was error not
to allow a son to testify by telephone in a suit brought by his
mother to recover loan advances and personal property.308  Defen-
dant Irene Silvers advanced money to her son, plaintiff Michael
Silvers, over several years.309  Irene and her domestic companion
also stored several items of personal property at Michael’s resi-
dence.310  After Michael sold his house, Irene discovered that nu-
merous items belonging to her had disappeared.311  She filed suit for
conversion of her missing personal property and repayment of the
advanced funds.312  The superior court awarded damages in a trial
in which Michael did not appear.313
The supreme court held that the superior court committed re-
versible error by rejecting Michael’s request to appear at trial tele-
phonically since Michael had relocated out-of-state.314  The court
held that Michael’s promise to repay the money that Irene ad-
vanced him without a specific time of repayment term did not fail
for indefiniteness.315  The pledge to repay the money when Michael
became financially able was a conditional promise, which became
legally enforceable when Michael satisfied the condition.316  The
court remanded the issue to determine when Michael in fact be-
came financially able to repay the loans and to apply the statute of
limitations from that date.317  The court held that, on remand, Irene
could join her domestic companion’s estate as a party to the litiga-
tion or alternatively could seek recovery for only her share of the
allegedly converted property.318
In Stinson v. Russell,319 the supreme court held that the lower
court abused its discretion by denying appellant Stinson’s Alaska
Civil Rule 60(b) motion without making a determination with re-
spect to the issue of incompetence on which the motion was
306. See id. at 133.
307. 999 P.2d 786 (Alaska 2000).
308. See id. at 790, 794.
309. See id. at 788.
310. See id.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id. at 790.
315. See id. at 790-791.
316. See id. at 791.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 792.
319. 996 P.2d 1238 (Alaska 2000).
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based.320  The appellant real estate agent was found to have
breached his fiduciary duty to buyers of a home and was held liable
for damages following a trial that he did not attend due to a serious
medical condition.321  He subsequently moved for relief from the
judgment under Rule 60(b) on the grounds that he had been legally
incompetent at the time of trial, and thus had been incapable of
understanding the consequences of failing to attend the trial or re-
questing a continuance.322  Although Stinson made a prima facie
showing of incompetence, the lower court denied the motion with-
out conducting an evidentiary hearing.323  The supreme court held
that this was an abuse of discretion because the motion papers re-
vealed a genuine dispute as to Stinson’s competence when he chose
not to attend the trial, present a defense, or move for a continu-
ance, and “[these] circumstances demonstrated the probable preju-
dice resulting from any incompetency, and therefore demonstrated
the materiality of the dispute.”324
In White v. Department of Natural Resources,325 the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Department of Natural Resources (the “Depart-
ment”).326  White owned two state oil and gas leases that occupied
state mental health trust land.327  White applied to transfer the
leases, but before the Department acted on the applications, a
court order was issued that barred the state from transferring any
interest in mental health trust land without the court’s approval.328
As a result, White’s applications were denied, and when he took no
further action, his leases expired.329  He appealed their expiration to
the Department and eventually to the supreme court on a force
majeure theory, but the court upheld the Department’s determina-
tion that White was responsible for allowing the leases to expire.330
In this subsequent action for breach of contract and unlawful tak-
ing of property, the supreme court held that res judicata barred his
claims because he challenged the same departmental actions that
he litigated in his prior case in which a final judgment against him
320. See id. at 1239.
321. See id. at 1239-40.
322. See id. at 1239-41.
323. See id. at 1240.
324. Id. at 1242.
325. 14 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2000).
326. See id. at 963.
327. See id. at 958.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. See id.
YIR_FMT.DOC 04/24/01  12:03 PM
2001] THE YEAR IN REVIEW 99
was issued.331  In addition, the court held that because White did
not show prejudicial error, the superior court did not err when it
converted the Department’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
to a motion for summary judgment and, as a result, did not give
White time to submit additional evidence.332
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Due Process
In Halliburton Energy Services v. Department of Labor,333 the
supreme court held that process safety management standards
were sufficiently clear as applied to the manufacture of perforation
guns to avoid a constitutional challenge.334  After a fatal explosion
at the Halliburton plant, the Department of Labor assessed a fine
for violating process safety management standards in the manufac-
ture of explosives.335  The supreme court rejected Halliburton’s ar-
gument that manufacturing perforation guns falls under a regula-
tory exemption for “oil well servicing activities,” because
manufacturing the guns and the act of perforating wells are two dif-
ferent activities, and pose different hazards.336  The court also re-
jected Halliburton’s constitutional claim, holding that the safety
standards were sufficiently clear to provide notice to Halliburton
for three reasons: (1) Halliburton presented no clear evidence of
inconsistent agency positions, (2) Halliburton did not demonstrate
reliance on a particular interpretation, and (3) a company in Halli-
burton’s position bears a “substantial burden of inquiry” concern-
ing applicable safety standards.337
In Raphael v. State,338 the supreme court held that the trial
court denied the defendant his due process right and his right to be
present at trial by incarcerating a witness at an ex parte hearing
prior to her testimony.339  Wilfred Raphael was indicted for the kid-
napping and assault of I.W., his live-in companion.340  I.W. was
331. See id. at 960.
332. See id. at 962-63.
333. 2 P.3d 41 (Alaska 2000).
334. See id. at 51.
335. See id. at 42.
336. Id. at 43.
337. Id. at 55.
338. 994 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 2000).
339. See id. at 1016.
340. See id. at 1006.
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scheduled to testify at Raphael’s trial.341  During a recess, the
prosecutor spoke with the trial judge about I.W.’s testimony with-
out Raphael or his attorney present.342  The prosecutor expressed
concern over I.W.’s drinking and the possibility of her recanting
her testimony.343  The trial court decided to place I.W. in jail and
her children in protective custody until she gave her testimony.344
I.W. testified and Raphael was convicted.345
On appeal, the supreme court held that the State coerced I.W.
to testify favorably on its behalf by implying continued incarcera-
tion and loss of custody of her children,346 and therefore, her testi-
mony violated Raphael’s right to due process.347  The court also
held that the trial court’s ex parte hearing violated Raphael’s right
to be present at every stage of his trial under Alaska Criminal Rule
38(a).348  Even though Raphael’s counsel failed to object to the ex
parte hearing or I.W.’s testimony at trial, the court held that the
trial court committed plain error, and as a result, the court could
review these errors on appeal,.349  The court reversed Raphael’s
conviction and remanded for a new trial.350
B. Miscellaneous
In Bethel Native Corp. v. Department of the Interior,351 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a third-party claim
for equitable apportionment brought by the United States against
Alaska was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.352  Bethel Na-
tive Corporation brought suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act after diesel fuel leaked onto its property
from a storage site operated by the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs.353  The United States then brought a third-party claim
against the State, the city to whom the fuel had been sold, and the
city’s allegedly negligent contractors, seeking equitable apportion-
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 1007.
346. See id. at 1008-10.
347. See id. at 1010.
348. See id. at 1011-13.
349. See id. at 1015.
350. See id. at 1016.
351. 208 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2000).
352. See id. at 1177.
353. See id. at 1172-73.
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ment of tort liability.354  The State’s motion to dismiss the claim on
the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity was denied, and the
State appealed.355  Citing Alden v. Maine,356 the court of appeals
held that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to ac-
tions brought by the United States in federal courts.357  The court of
appeals also concluded that the claim could stand because the pri-
mary purpose of the equitable apportionment remedy was to re-
duce the potential damages the plaintiff could recover against the
United States, rather than to create any ongoing legal duty be-
tween the adverse tortfeasors.358
In Brown v. Ely,359 the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of
Brown’s federal civil rights claim, reversed the denial of Brown’s
motion to amend his complaint, and vacated the award of attor-
ney’s fees.360  While investigating a game violation, officers of the
Fish and Wildlife Protection department and the Hoonah City Po-
lice department visited Brown’s house and smelled marijuana.361
After obtaining a search warrant, the officers returned to Brown’s
house but did not find any marijuana or drug paraphernalia.362
Brown was charged with misconduct involving a controlled sub-
stance, but the charge was later dropped.363  Brown subsequently
filed a complaint alleging that the search violated his right to pri-
vacy and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.364  How-
ever, because the right to possess marijuana, which Brown alleged
was protected under state law, is prohibited by federal law, the
court held that the officers had probable cause and therefore the
search was not illegal under the Fourth Amendment.365  In addition,
the court construed Alaska Civil Rule 15(c) broadly to allow
Brown to amend his complaint to include a malicious prosecution
claim against the Hoonah Chief of Police, because the claim arose
out of the same conduct and facts alleged in the original com-
plaint.366  Finally, the court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and
354. See id. at 1173.
355. See id.
356. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
357. See Bethel Native Corp., 208 F.3d at 1173.
358. See id. at 1176-77.
359. 14 P.3d 257 (Alaska 2000).
360. See id. at 264.
361. See id. at 258.
362. See id. at 259.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See id. at 260.
366. See id. at 262-63.
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directed that, on remand, the award should not include any fees in-
curred in defending the civil rights claim.367
In O’Callaghan v. Divisions of Elections,368 the supreme court
affirmed the superior court’s order denying O’Callaghan’s chal-
lenge to emergency regulations by the Division of Elections (the
“Division”) that temporarily adopted a partially closed ballot pri-
mary election in place of the blanket primary election prescribed in
Alaska Statutes section 15.25.060.369  The court had previously in-
validated such emergency regulations, holding that Alaska Statutes
section 15.25.060 was constitutional.370  However, it had also previ-
ously determined that the Division would have authority to “abro-
gate a statute that is clearly unconstitutional under a United States
Supreme Court decision dealing with similar law, without having to
wait for another court decision specifically declaring the statute un-
constitutional.”371  Because the United States Supreme Court held
that a similar blanket primary statute in California violated the
First Amendment, and because there were no constitutionally sig-
nificant differences between the California and Alaska statutes, the
court concluded that Alaska Statutes section 15.25.060 was uncon-
stitutional, and that the Division had authority to abrogate the
statute and promulgate emergency regulations.372  The court also
held the partially closed primary did not impermissibly infringe
upon the Alaska Constitution’s voting secrecy clause.373
VI.  CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure.  In Beavers v. State,374 the supreme
court held that a confession in a criminal case is involuntary, and
hence inadmissible, if partially induced by a police officer’s threat
of harsher treatment.375  The court vacated Beavers’ indictment for
first-degree robbery, reversing a court of appeals ruling that found
Beavers’ confession voluntary under the “totality of the circum-
367. See id. at 263-64.
368. 6 P.3d 728 (Alaska 2000).
369. See id. at 730.
370. See id.
371. Id.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 731-32.
374. 998 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 2000).
375. See id. at 1041.
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stances.”376  Beavers confessed to the crime after two Alaska State
Troopers asked Beavers to enter the troopers’ vehicle and give
them information about two Anchorage robberies.377  The troopers’
threat to Beavers that he would be “hammered” if he attempted to
hide his conduct from the trooper and that “we’re going to have to
talk about that” conveyed a strong message that Beavers would be
punished, and could not fully exercise his constitutional right to si-
lence.378  The court held that a law enforcement officer’s threat of
harsher than normal treatment, in whatever words, sends a mes-
sage to criminal suspects that they will be punished for their si-
lence.379  Since there was no evidence affirmatively indicating that
the suspect’s will was not overcome by the threats, Beavers’ confes-
sion was involuntary and could not be used against him in his
criminal trial.380
In Jones v. State,381 the court of appeals overturned a convic-
tion for possession of a controlled substance because the drug evi-
dence was obtained as a result of an unlawful investigative stop.382
Anchorage police responded to a 911 call concerning an argument
between Everett Jones and his landlord.383  When the officers at-
tempted to ask Jones what happened, Jones began to walk away
from the officers.384  After Jones ignored repeated requests to keep
his hands away from his pockets, the officers restrained him, and
ultimately handcuffed him when he began to resist.385  The officers
searched Jones and found cocaine.386  Jones was convicted of pos-
session of cocaine and resisting arrest.387  The court held that the
police could not lawfully restrain Jones at the scene of the dis-
pute.388  Although the police knew that Jones was involved in a dis-
pute with his landlord, they “had no indication that Jones had as-
saulted the landlord or had committed any illegal act.”389
Accordingly, there was no basis to require Jones to stay at the
scene, and therefore, the cocaine was seized as the result of an ille-
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. Id. at 1047.
379. See id. at 1046.
380. See id. at 1047.
381. 11 P.3d 998 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
382. See id. at 999.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id. at 999-1000.
386. See id. at 1000.
387. See id.
388. See id. at 1000-01.
389. Id. at 1000.
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gal investigative stop.390  The court held that Jones’ conviction for
resisting arrest would be upheld if the State proved on remand that
“the police were arresting Jones, that Jones knew the officers were
arresting him, and that Jones used force with the intent to prevent
the officers from making the arrest.”391
In Lewis v. State,392 the court of appeals affirmed all but one of
Lewis’ felony drug convictions that resulted from evidence found
pursuant to a search warrant that had originally been obtained to
search for evidence of a Fish and Game Department violation.393
The warrant authorized the police to search for evidence of the
game violation, including an assault rifle and ammunition.394  Lewis
moved to suppress the obtained evidence, arguing that the affidavit
in support of the search warrant did not establish probable cause
that he was the person who committed the game violation.395  The
superior court judge agreed that the evidence was insufficient to es-
tablish probable cause with respect to the game violation.396  How-
ever, the judge concluded that the warrant should be upheld be-
cause there was probable cause to believe that Lewis had violated a
condition of his probation by possessing a firearm and that evi-
dence of this offense would be found at his residence.397  The judge
held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that even if the warrant
improperly states the crime under investigation, it will still be up-
held if it establishes probable cause to search a particular place for
the evidence named in the warrant.398  The court of appeals re-
versed Lewis’ conviction for possession of firearms during the
commission of a felony drug offense because the state failed to
prove a nexus between his possession of the weapon and his com-
mission of the felony drug offense.399
In Murray v. State,400 the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s conviction of Murray for several offenses involving drug
possession, but vacated a conviction for second-degree misconduct
involving use of a weapon and remanded the case for further con-
390. See id.
391. Id. at 1001.
392. 9 P.3d 1028 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
393. See id. at 1028-31.
394. See id. at 1032.
395. See id. at 1031.
396. See id.
397. See id.
398. See id. at 1033-34.
399. See id. at 1038.
400. 12 P.3d 784 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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sideration of that count.401  On August 13, 1997, the police received
an anonymous call reporting that there was a dead body in Room
222 of an Anchorage motel.402  When the police arrived at the
room, Murray let them in to search it.403  Murray was never advised
of his Miranda rights, and, during questioning, he admitted that he
had used drugs and was on probation for a prior drug offense.
Murray also mentioned that his girlfriend, Jeannie Joy, was out
driving his car in search of cocaine.404  After finding Joy, the officers
obtained Murray’s consent to search the car.405  Joy told the officers
that there was marijuana in the car and that Murray owned a fire-
arm.406  The officers then questioned Murray again, who initially
agreed to let them search his home, but then refused to sign a con-
sent-to-search form.407  The police returned with a search warrant
and found, inter alia, a bag containing six ounces of marijuana and
a loaded handgun.408
Murray contested the admissibility of evidence acquired in the
motel room, including his own statements; he also filed a motion to
quash the search warrant (and the evidence obtained from the
search of his residence) on the grounds that, without his motel
room statements, the remaining evidence was not sufficient to sup-
port a warrant.409  The superior court held that Murray had con-
sented to the search of the motel room, and thus admitted the
physical evidence; however, the court held that Murray’s motel
room statements could be suppressed since he was not given his
Miranda warning.  Nevertheless, the court did not quash the search
warrant.410  The court of appeals agreed that Murray did consent to
the search of the motel room and that Murray further consented to
the search of the car; thus, the search warrant was supported by
probable cause.411  Evidence later found in the car and in Murray’s
residence was not derived from statements made during a possible
Miranda violation.412  The court of appeals, therefore, affirmed the
drug convictions.  As to the count of second-degree weapons mis-
401. See id. at 795.
402. See id. at 787.
403. See id.
404. See id.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. See id. at 787-88.
408. See id.
409. See id. at 788.
410. See id.
411. See id. at 789, 792-93.
412. See id. at 791.
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conduct, the court of appeals held that the State must show a nexus
between a defendant’s possession of a firearm and the commission
of a felony drug offense.413
In Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage,414 the court of appeals
held that a motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated
(“DWI”) continued to pose a potential imminent danger to the
driving public, even though he had parked his car in his driveway
and exited his vehicle.415  A police officer testified that he watched
Daniel Shearer’s Jeep move back and forth between traffic lanes
and pass vehicles at a high rate of speed.416  The police officer testi-
fied that, based on his training and experience, his impression was
that the driver of the Jeep was intoxicated.417  Shearer’s motion to
suppress the evidence obtained after his initial contact with the of-
ficer was denied.418  On the basis of a breath test that exceeded the
legal limit, Shearer pled no contest to DWI.419  Shearer appealed
the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.420  Shearer
claimed that because he parked his Jeep in his driveway, exited the
vehicle, and was headed towards his home when the police officer
contacted him, the officer had no basis to reasonably suspect that
Shearer continued to pose an imminent danger to the motoring
public.421  The court held that the police officer had reasonable sus-
picion, based on his observations of Shearer’s driving, that Shearer
posed an imminent danger to public safety.422  Although Shearer
claimed he was home for the night, the court found that there was
nothing to prevent Shearer from going inside his house, coming
back out, and driving again.423
2. Miscellaneous.  In Alexander v. Municipality of Anchor-
age,424 the court of appeals upheld Alexander’s conviction for driv-
ing while intoxicated, finding that the police had not interfered
with his right to consult with his attorney.425  Alexander was taken
to the police substation for a breath test after being arrested for
413. See id. at 794.
414. 4 P.3d 336 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
415. See id. at 340.
416. See id. at 337.
417. See id.
418. See id. at 338.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. See id.
422. See id. at 340.
423. See id.
424. 15 P.3d 269 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
425. See id. at 269.
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driving while intoxicated (“DWI”).426  Pursuant to policy, the police
officer kept Alexander’s hands handcuffed behind his back.427
When Alexander could not hold the telephone between his ear and
his shoulder, the police officer held the phone for him.428  Alexan-
der claimed that the police officer’s proximity interfered with his
right to speak privately with his attorney.429  Additionally, although
the police officer had turned off the substation’s tape recorder, he
had not turned off his personal tape recorder.430  Although the trial
court excluded evidence of the tape recorded conversation, it did
not suppress the breath test results.431  The decision of the trial
court was affirmed, because Alexander could not show that his
conversation with his attorney was harmed by the police officer re-
cording the conversation, and because the police officer had made
an effort to allow Alexander to hold the phone between his ear and
shoulder.432
In Bushnell v. State,433 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 28.40.060 did not violate due process in a driving
while intoxicated (“DWI”) case based on test results obtained by
an instrument with a working tolerance of .01 percent.434  Following
a jury trial, Albert Bushnell was convicted of felony DWI on the
basis of a breath test.435  The court of appeals upheld the conviction,
finding that a working tolerance of .01 percent of a properly cali-
brated instrument was “tolerably inaccurate” under Alaska Stat-
utes section 28.40.060.436  The court rejected an interpretation of
section 28.40.060 that would require the State to prove the driver’s
blood actually contained at least .10 percent alcohol by weight or at
least .10 grams of alcohol per 210 liters.437  In light of the history of
the chemical test (the “Intoximeter”) in Alaska cases and its estab-
lished working tolerance, the court found that the legislature im-
plicitly decided that a .01 percent working tolerance was “tolerably
inaccurate,” and, therefore, irrelevant to the driver’s guilt under
Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(a)(2).438  The court also held that
426. See id. at 269-70.
427. See id. at 270.
428. See id.
429. See id.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See id. at 271-72.
433. 5 P.3d 889 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
434. See id. at 890.
435. See id.
436. Id. at 892.
437. See id.
438. Id.
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section 28.40.060’s exemption for those aged fourteen to twenty-
one who are charged under another statute does not violate Bush-
nell’s state and federal rights to equal protection because minors
are in fact subject to a stricter law under the exemption.439
B. General Criminal Law
1. Criminal Procedure.  In Dodds v. State,440 the court of ap-
peals held that the trial court did not err by failing to have the jury
decide whether the State had proved the corpus delicti of a robbery
charge.441  Ian Dodds appealed his conviction for first-degree rob-
bery, claiming that the trial judge committed plain error when he
neglected to tell the jury that they could not convict Dodds unless
the State presented substantial independent evidence tending to es-
tablish that Dodds was, in fact, one of the robbers.442  The court of
appeals disagreed.443  The court held that, when trying to prove a
defendant has violated a criminal statute, the corpus delicti rule
only requires the State to introduce independent evidence of the
occurrence of the injury, loss, or other harm specified in the stat-
ute, not independent evidence of the defendant’s participation in
causing this injury, loss, or harm.444  The trial raised no issue of cor-
pus delicti, because the occurrence of the robbery was not seriously
contested.445  The court further held that juries do not decide the is-
sue of corpus delicti, therefore no corpus delicti instruction was
necessary.446
In Flanigan v. State,447 the court of appeals held that a state
statutory time limit on a prisoner’s petition for post-conviction re-
lief did not violate the state constitution clause barring suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus.448  More than twelve years after his
conviction for murder, Flanigan filed an application for post-
conviction relief, which was dismissed by the trial court because it
was filed after the deadline date mandated by Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 12.72.020.449  Although the prisoner argued that the time bar
439. See id. at 892-93.
440. 997 P.2d 536 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
441. See id. at 538.
442. See id.
443. See id. at 539.
444. See id.
445. See id.
446. See id. at 542-43.
447. 3 P.3d 372 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
448. See id. at 376.
449. See id. at 373.
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violated federal and state constitutional prohibitions on suspending
the writ of habeas corpus, the court of appeals held that the United
States Constitution limited only the federal government’s power to
suspend the writ.450  The court of appeals held that the writ pro-
tected by the state constitution’s suspension clause was the same in
scope as the writ at common law, which was limited to testing the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court.451  Dismissal of the petition was
proper, because the prisoner’s claim for relief did not challenge the
sentencing court’s jurisdiction.452  The court of appeals also held
that the prisoner’s inability to access the Alaska Statutes did not
qualify the prisoner for relief, because he was not “physically pre-
vented” from filing a timely petition.453
In Grinols v. State,454 the court of appeals held that, because
Alaska grants a right to counsel during post-conviction relief pro-
ceedings, a defendant may be entitled to relief for incompetent
counsel.455  In challenging the competency of an attorney in such a
proceeding, a defendant must prove: (1) “their [sic] own diligence
in raising the claim of ineffective representation”; (2) “the incom-
petence of their [sic] prior post-conviction relief attorney”; (3)
“that the omitted legal issue is, in fact, meritorious—that if the un-
derlying issue had been litigated, the defendant would have won”;
and (4) “there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the
defendant’s original trial court proceedings would have been dif-
ferent.”456  The court held that a defendant is not entitled to an at-
torney for a second petition for post-conviction relief.457  However,
the trial court may appoint counsel in individual cases.458  In addi-
tion, the court affirmed the constitutionality of Civil Rule 86(m),
which provides that post-conviction relief is the procedural method
for collaterally attacking a criminal conviction and upheld the con-
stitutionality, with limited exceptions, of Alaska Statutes section
12.72.020(a)(6), which bars multiple petitions for post-conviction
relief.459
450. See id. at 374.
451. See id. at 375-76.
452. See id. at 376.
453. See id. at 376-77.
454. 10 P.3d 600 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
455. See id. at 618.
456. Id. at 619-20.
457. See id. at 624.
458. See id.
459. See id.
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In Hertz v. State,460 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s order that directed Hertz to refile his complaint for habeas
corpus as a request for post-conviction relief.461  Alaska Civil Rule
86(m) governs habeas corpus procedures and provides that the rule
“does not apply to any post-conviction proceeding that could be
brought under Criminal Rule 35.1.”462  Hertz argued that his appli-
cation for habeas corpus could not be brought under Criminal Rule
35.1 because his application was subject to dismissal under Alaska
Statutes section 12.72.020(a).463  Therefore, Civil Rule 86(m) did
not apply because his complaint would be dismissed as an applica-
tion for post-conviction relief.464  However, because Hertz’ applica-
tion alleged a constitutionally based claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the complaint could be brought under Alaska Criminal
Rule 35.1 and Civil Rule 86(m) applied.465  Hertz also argued that
he should be able to maintain his habeas corpus action and not be
subject to the statutory bars in Alaska Statutes section
12.72.020(a).466  However, because Hertz was not claiming that his
original conviction was void, he could not seek redress in habeas
corpus and his complaint was subject to the limitations of the stat-
ute.467
In Howarth v. State,468 the court of appeals held that the supe-
rior court abused its discretion in dismissing a petition for post-
conviction relief where there were signs of attorney neglect.469  Wil-
liam Howarth was found guilty of second-degree murder, but filed
a petition for post-conviction relief.470  The superior court ap-
pointed an attorney to represent Howarth.471  The State moved to
dismiss, arguing that Howarth’s claims were barred and did not es-
tablish a case.472  The superior court dismissed the petition for post-
conviction relief because the court-appointed attorney failed to file
a response.473  The court of appeals reversed because the superior
court dismissed the petition without demanding a response to the
460. 8 P.3d 1144 (Alaska 2000).
461. See id. at 1145.
462. Id. at 1146.
463. See id.
464. See id.
465. See id. at 1147.
466. See id. at 1148.
467. See id. at 1148-49.
468. 13 P.3d 754 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
469. See id. at 754.
470. See id.
471. See id.
472. See id. at 754-55.
473. See id. at 755-56.
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motion to dismiss.474  The court should not have dismissed the peti-
tion until the suggestion of ineffective counsel was “dispelled – or,
if it is not dispelled, until a new attorney is appointed and has a
meaningful opportunity to aid Howarth in reformulating his peti-
tion for post-conviction relief.”475
In Lonis v. State,476 the court of appeals held that the trial court
erred by ordering forfeiture of a defendant’s bond based on the de-
fendant’s failure to abide by his conditions of release, but upheld
the trial court’s decision to bar defendant from personally ad-
dressing the jury and making him pay restitution to the victim’s in-
surance company.477  The defendant Michael Lonis, along with his
son, was driving a pickup truck when Lonis lost control of the
truck. 478  The truck crashed into the home of Wes and Helen Allen,
causing injuries to Mrs. Allen’s neck and stomach.479  After the
crash, Lonis backed out of the Allen’s house and drove away.480
Lonis, who appeared to arm himself with a rifle, threatened to kill
police officers when they arrived at his apartment.481  A grand jury
indicted Lonis for two counts of assault in the third-degree for
threatening the police officers, two counts of assault in the third-
degree for injuring his son and Mrs. Allen in the truck accident,
one count of driving while intoxicated, and one count of failing to
give immediate notice of an accident to the police.482  After the trial
court found that Lonis had violated the conditions of his bail re-
lease, the judge ordered forfeiture of $4500 of Lonis’ $5000 bond.483
The court of appeals overturned the judge’s ruling and ordered the
money returned to Lonis.484  The court held that Alaska Statutes
section 12.30.060 authorizes a court to seize pledged bail money
when the defendant willfully fails to appear, but does not give
courts the authority to seize a defendant’s bail when the defendant
fails to comply with the other conditions of release.485  However,
the trial court did not err in refusing to let Lonis address the jury at
the end of the case because, in a case where Lonis chose not to tes-
474. See id. at 756.
475. Id. at 757.
476. 998 P.2d 441 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
477. See id. at 443.
478. See id.
479. See id.
480. See id.
481. See id.
482. See id.
483. See id. at 444.
484. See id. at 445.
485. See id. at 444.
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tify, it would be unfair to have Lonis address the jury and give him
some of the benefits of testifying without being subject to cross-
examination.486  Finally, the court ruled that Lonis had no standing
to complain that the trial court ordered the restitution be paid di-
rectly to the insurance company instead of through the Allens.487
In Mullin v. State,488 the court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s decision to dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief on
the ground that it was filed too late.489  Mullin filed a petition for
post-conviction relief exactly three days before the deadline im-
posed by the statute of limitations.490  However, the superior court
clerk’s office did not accept the petition because Mullin had not in-
cluded the $100 filing fee or, in the alternative, an application for
exemption from the fee.491  The clerk’s office notified Mullin of the
omission, and Mullin filed the exemption application several weeks
later, after the deadline had passed.492  The superior court dismissed
the petition, finding that it was not filed in time.493  The court of ap-
peals determined that Mullin’s initial, though technically incom-
plete, filing of the petition satisfied the statute of limitations.494  The
court of appeals reinstated Mullin’s petition and remanded it to the
superior court for renewed proceedings.495
In Schumacher v. State,496 the court of appeals affirmed Schu-
macher’s conviction for six felony counts of sexual abuse of his
three sons and the resulting composite sentence of fifteen years.497
On appeal, Schumacher argued that the court should have dis-
missed his indictment because his sons’ testimony was unreliable.498
Because he did not raise the objection before trial, the court held
that the objection had been waived.499  For the same reasons,
Schumacher argued that the court should have declared a mistrial
or conducted a “taint hearing.”500  However, because judges could
differ about the need for a taint hearing, the trial judge did not err
486. See id. at 447.
487. See id. at 448.
488. 996 P.2d 737 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
489. See id. at 740.
490. See id. at 738.
491. See id.
492. See id.
493. See id.
494. See id. at 740.
495. See id.
496. 11 P.3d 397 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
497. See id. at 402.
498. See id. at 399.
499. See id.
500. See id.
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when he did not order one.501  Next, Schumacher argued that the
trial court erred when it allowed a detective to demonstrate how
Schumacher wiped his groin area in the detective’s presence.502  The
court held that permitting the detective to demonstrate his per-
sonal observations was not an abuse of discretion because Schu-
macher’s defense raised the issue of whether he had the physical
ability to reach his groin area.503  In addition, Schumacher argued
that the trial court erred when it did not allow Schumacher to per-
form his own demonstration without taking the stand.504  The court
held that the judge did not err by disallowing the demonstration
because the demonstration would show a voluntary range of mo-
tion that could be manipulated rather than a physical characteris-
tic.505  Lastly, Schumacher argued that his sentence of fifteen years
was excessive.506  However, because the term was in the upper
range of the benchmark sentence and because his crimes were ag-
gravated, the court held that the sentence was not clearly mis-
taken.507
In State v. Roberts,508 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 12.30.027 forbids a trial court from permitting a
person released on a charge or conviction of a crime involving do-
mestic violence to return to the residence of his alleged victim.509
Lincoln Roberts was convicted of third-degree assault for assault-
ing M.J., with whom he lived and had a domestic relationship.510
Following Roberts’ initial release on bail during the pendency of
his appeal, Roberts was granted a modification on his release con-
ditions so that he could reside in the same residence with the as-
sault victim.511  After the court of appeals granted the petition for
review, Roberts moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it
was moot because Roberts had violated his conditions of release
and was in custody.512  The court of appeals declined to dismiss the
case, arguing that the case fell within the public interest exception
to the mootness doctrine.513  On the merits, the court relied on leg-
501. See id.
502. See id.
503. See id. at 400.
504. See id.
505. See id.
506. See id. at 401.
507. See id. at 401-02.
508. 999 P.2d 151 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
509. See id. at 152.
510. See id.
511. See id. at 152-53.
512. See id. at 153.
513. See id.
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islative intent to hold that the statute prevented courts from re-
leasing to the residence of the alleged victim defendants charged
with or convicted of a crime of domestic violence.514
In United States v. Hinojosa-Perez,515 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction for reenter-
ing the United States after deportation, because the defendant
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available for attack-
ing the original deportation order.516  In an order instituting depor-
tation proceedings, the defendant was informed of his obligation to
provide any changes in his address to the office of the Immigration
Judge in charge of his case.517  After his deportation hearing, the de-
fendant appealed the denial of his request to depart the country
voluntarily.518  The defendant continued to correspond with the
agency handling his appeal but failed to notify the agency when he
moved to a new address.519  Although he prevailed on appeal, the
defendant did not appear at his remand hearing and was de-
ported.520  The defendant was again deported after reentering the
United States the following year, and after he reentered the coun-
try a second time, he was charged with the corresponding felony.521
The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging a due process violation
because he did not receive notice of his original deportation re-
mand hearing.522  He appealed from the district court’s refusal to
dismiss and reasserted the collateral challenge to his deportation
order.523  The court of appeals decided that the defendant had no-
tice of his obligation to inform the State of any address changes,
and because he failed to do so, he had constructive notice of the
remand hearing and the possibility of appealing the deportation
order.524  The court held that because the defendant did not contest
the order, he had not exhausted his administrative remedies and
was now barred from contesting the order in his criminal case.525
In Wardlow v. State,526 the court of appeals affirmed the convic-
tion of a defendant who alleged that he was denied his right to a
514. See id. at 154-55.
515. 206 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2000).
516. See id. at 833.
517. See id.
518. See id. at 833-34.
519. See id. at 834.
520. See id.
521. See id.
522. See id.
523. See id. at 835.
524. See id. at 835-37.
525. See id.
526. 2 P.3d 1238 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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speedy trial and that certain evidence against him had been admit-
ted erroneously.527  Wardlow was convicted of second-degree as-
sault, two counts of first-degree sexual assault, and kidnapping.528
Wardlow appealed the conviction, claiming that he had been de-
nied the right to a speedy trial as provided in Alaska Civil Rule
45.529  Under that rule, Wardlow’s trial was to have commenced by
September 8, 1997, but scheduling conflicts delayed the beginning
of the trial by more than a week.530  Wardlow’s attorney agreed
with the prosecutor to reschedule the trial.  Wardlow signed a writ-
ten waiver of Civil Rule 45, but then repudiated the waiver.531  The
court of appeals held that, even if Wardlow had not signed the
waiver, Rule 45 was waived when Wardlow’s attorney joined the
prosecutor’s motion to set the trial at a later date.532  The court of
appeals also held that the trial judge’s decision to allow evidence of
Wardlow’s prior assault on another woman was consistent with
legislative intent and did not violate the rules of evidence.533  Evi-
dence of prior assaults is admissible to establish a defendant’s pro-
pensity to sexually assault women when the defendant raises a de-
fense of consent.534  The court of appeals also affirmed Wardlow’s
composite sentence of sixty years, given the aggravating nature of
the criminal acts.535
2. Evidence.  In Ashley v. State,536 the court of appeals af-
firmed a reckless driving conviction, unpersuaded by the appel-
lant’s argument that his conviction was supported by insufficient
evidence.537  The court of appeals held that although the conviction
was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence, the evidence
was sufficient to convince a reasonable person that Ashley was
guilty of reckless driving.538  The court also gave weight to the fact
that Ashley testified in court and failed to convince the jury that his
was the correct explanation for how the accident occurred.539  The
court of appeals held that the two charges of reckless driving and
527. See id. at 1254.
528. See id. at 1241.
529. See id. at 1243.
530. See id. at 1242-43.
531. See id. at 1243.
532. See id. at 1244.
533. See id. at 1247.
534. See id. at 1248.
535. See id. at 1254.
536. 6 P.3d 738 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
537. See id. at 738, 744.
538. See id. at 744.
539. See id.
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failure to report an accident had been properly joined because they
arose out of the same accident and because their joinder did not
unfairly prejudice Ashley.540  Furthermore, the court concluded that
Ashley had waived his evidentiary objections with respect to the
police officer’s testimony, because he did not raise them during the
trial.541
In Lowe v. State,542 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s conviction of Lowe for tampering with evidence.543  Robert
Meyer was charged with the murder of his wife and daughter and
the arson of his boat.544  After Meyer reported his boat was on fire
and his wife and daughter were missing, he went to Ann Lowe’s
home, where Lowe proceeded to wash his clothing, which smelled
heavily of diesel fuel.545  When the police arrived at Lowe’s home,
they advised her, in a tape recorded conversation, not to wash
Meyer’s clothing any further than she already had.546  Lowe moved
to dismiss her indictment due to the State’s failure to present ex-
culpatory evidence—the tape recorded conversation.547  The trial
judge concluded that the prosecutor’s questioning of the police of-
ficer did not substantially deviate from the taped conversation, and
therefore affirmed her indictment.548  Lowe also argued that the
evidence of Meyer’s guilt was highly prejudicial and allowed the
jury to speculate as to her own guilt.549  The judge, however, ruled
that the State could present a “foundational basis for this investiga-
tion.”550  The court of appeals found that all of the judge’s findings
were supported by the record and affirmed the conviction.551
In McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage,552 the court of
appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to admit evidence that the
defendant refused to perform two additional field sobriety tests in
a Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”) case.553  John McCormick
was asked to perform field sobriety tests by a police officer follow-
540. See id. at 740-41.
541. See id. at 738.
542. No. A-7387, No. 4318, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 197, at *1 (Dec. 13, 2000).
543. See id. at *2.
544. See id. at *1.
545. See id. at *2-3.
546. See id.
547. See id. at *5.
548. See id. at *6.
549. See id. at *10.
550. Id. at *8.
551. See id. at *14.
552. 999 P.2d 155 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
553. See id. at 158-59.
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ing a traffic accident.554  McCormick submitted to the first sobriety
test, and after refusing to perform two additional tests, he was ar-
rested for driving under the influence.555  McCormick later re-
quested and obtained an independent blood test at a local hospital,
which was sent to a laboratory in Colorado without the Municipal-
ity’s knowledge.556  When the Municipality sought a blood sample,
it obtained a court order directing the hospital to surrender any
unused blood to the Municipality for further testing.557  The Mu-
nicipality introduced evidence at trial that McCormick had refused
to perform the latter two field sobriety tests, and that the blood ob-
tained from the hospital yielded a result of .125 percent alcohol.558
The court of appeals held that the government can introduce evi-
dence of, and comment on, a motorist’s refusal to perform field so-
briety tests after the motorist is stopped validly on suspicion of
driving while intoxicated.559  In addition, the court held that the trial
court acted lawfully when it ordered McCormick’s attorney to sur-
render the unused portion of the blood sample to the Municipal-
ity.560  Lastly, the court held that the mandatory forfeiture provision
of Anchorage Municipal Code section 9.28.020(C)(5) does not
violate state law because Alaska Statutes section 28.35.038 author-
izes municipalities to enact vehicle impoundment and vehicle for-
feiture laws that are harsher than their state-law counterparts.561
Forfeiture of a $5000 vehicle was not so grossly disproportionate to
the repeat offense of driving while intoxicated as to represent an
“excessive fine” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.562
In Napoka v. State,563 the court of appeals reversed the convic-
tion of rape and granted a new trial because the court found that
the trial court had improperly excluded relevant evidence that the
defendant and the alleged victim had repeatedly engaged in con-
sensual sex.564  The defendant, who was charged with three counts
of first-degree sexual assault, sought to introduce evidence of pre-
vious consensual sexual encounters with the alleged victim.565  Un-
554. See id. at 157.
555. See id.
556. See id.
557. See id.
558. See id.
559. See id. at 158-59.
560. See id. at 163.
561. See id. at 168.
562. See id. at 169.
563. 996 P.2d 106 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
564. See id. at 112.
565. See id. at 107.
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der the state’s rape shield law, Alaska Statutes section 12.45.045,
evidence of a rape victim’s previous sexual conduct is not admissi-
ble at trial, unless the trial judge determines that the probative
value of the evidence outweighs the potential for undue preju-
dice.566  The court of appeals noted that the wording of the statute,
by failing to distinguish between past sexual activity in general and
specific sexual acts that may be related to the case at bar, does not
describe its purpose.567  The victim’s past sexual behavior in general
should not be introduced in a criminal rape proceeding because it is
irrelevant, especially where it concerns the victim’s sexual contacts
with individuals other than the defendant; however, the court
maintained that, if the evidence of previous sexual conduct is rele-
vant in a given case, then it should be admitted.568  Concluding that
the trial judge should have admitted the potentially exculpatory
evidence, the court of appeals reversed the rape conviction and or-
dered a new trial.569
In Seaman v. State,570 the court of appeals found that the trial
court did not err when it denied Seaman’s motion to suppress a
conversation obtained without a warrant.571  Seaman was convicted
of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance for
delivering cocaine to an undercover informant.572  The informant,
who was wired to a tape recorder, had a Glass573 warrant to record a
conversation between the informant and Michael Bridge, a sus-
pected cocaine dealer, but Seaman was not named in the warrant.574
Seaman then showed up in lieu of Bridge to deliver the cocaine and
the conversation was recorded.575  The court held that the warrant-
less recording was justified by exigent circumstances, because there
was not sufficient time to secure a new warrant.576
In Worthy v. State,577 the supreme court reversed a second-
degree sexual assault conviction and remanded the case for retrial,
holding that the trial court committed reversible error by excluding
evidence of a prior false allegation of sexual assault by the alleged
566. See id.
567. See id. at 108.
568. See id.
569. See id. at 112.
570. No. A-7150, No. 4317, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 200, at *1 (Dec. 13, 2000).
571. See id. at *11.
572. See id. at *3.
573. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978).
574. See Seaman, No. A-7150, No. 4317, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 200, at *1.
575. See id. at *3.
576. See id. at *10.
577. 999 P.2d 771 (Alaska 2000).
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victim.578  The supreme court determined that the usual rules ex-
cluding evidence of prior false allegations of sexual assault were in-
applicable because the issue of a prior false allegation of sexual as-
sault was made independently relevant by the State.579  The State
made the prior assault a fundamental part of its case against the de-
fendant.580  Therefore, the court held that the defendant was enti-
tled to litigate the truth or falsity of the prior allegation.581
3. Sentencing.  In Brown v. State,582 the court of appeals re-
versed Brown’s fifty-five-year sentence and ordered the trial judge
to sentence Brown to a term within the benchmark range.583
Brown’s sentence upon conviction of second-degree murder was in
excess of the twenty to thirty year benchmark range.584  In a previ-
ous decision, the court instructed the trial court to reduce Brown’s
sentence to no more than thirty years because it had not offered
any justification for sentencing Brown to a term above the bench-
mark range.585  The supreme court ordered the court of appeals to
review its decision in light of State v. Hodari,586 in which the court
warned appellate courts not to “articulate sentencing principles
and to fine-tune sentences.”587  In reviewing Brown’s sentence, the
court emphasized that it rejected the trial judge’s sentence on fac-
tual grounds, not legal grounds.588  Because the trial judge’s justifi-
cations for sentencing Brown to a term above the benchmark were
not supported by the record, the court again reversed Brown’s
fifty-five-year sentence and directed the sentencing judge to sen-
tence Brown to a term not more than the thirty year benchmark.589
In Clark v. State,590 the court of appeals held that presumptive
sentencing applies to defendants convicted of felony driving while
intoxicated (“DWI”).591  Johnny Clark drove a motor vehicle while
he was intoxicated in violation of Alaska Statutes section
578. See id. at 772-73.
579. See id. at 774.
580. See id.
581. See id. at 775.
582. 4 P.3d 961 (Alaska 2000).
583. See id. at 964.
584. See id. at 962.
585. See id.
586. 996 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 2000).
587. Brown, 4 P.3d at 963.
588. See id. at 964.
589. See id.
590. 8 P.3d 1149 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
591. See id. at 1150.
YIR_FMT.DOC 04/24/01  12:03 PM
120 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [18:1
28.35.030(a).592  Based on Clark’s two prior felonies, the superior
court ruled that Clark was subject to presumptive sentencing under
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.125 as a third felony offender.593
Since felony DWI is a class C felony, the trial judge ruled that
Clark faced a three-year presumptive term.594  Clark pleaded no
contest to this charge, and was sentenced to three and a half years
imprisonment.595  On appeal, Clark argued that mandatory mini-
mum sentences under section 28.35.030(n) should supplant or su-
persede the “minimum sentences” contained in the presumptive
sentencing statute.596  The court disagreed and held that the pre-
sumptive terms listed in Alaska Statutes section 12.55.125 are dif-
ferent from, and serve a different purpose than, the mandatory
minimum sentences for felony DWI listed in Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 28.35.030(n).597  The court affirmed both the presumptive sen-
tencing laws and application of the mandatory minimum sentences
established in Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(n).598
In Dollison v. State,599 the court of appeals held that the sen-
tencing court’s failure to consider as a mitigating factor that the de-
fendant possessed only a small quantity of a controlled substance
was harmless error, because the judge had stated that he would not
have adjusted the presumptive sentence.600  The court clarified an
earlier ruling setting out the “small quantity” mitigating factor601 by
stating that the typical drug case against which the quantity should
be measured “is a drug case where the quantity involved in the case
falls in the broad-middle ground penalized by the statute when
considering the nature of the substance, its form, its purity, its
commercial value, and its relative availability or scarcity,” rather
than the typically prosecuted case or the typical case on a judge’s
docket.602  The court also decided that because an arresting officer’s
discovery of a crack pipe during a pat-down search gave him prob-
able cause to believe defendant possessed drugs, the officer could
592. See id.
593. See id.
594. See id.
595. See id.
596. See id.
597. See id. 
598. See id. at 1151.
599. 5 P.3d 244 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
600. See id. at 248.
601. See id. (citing Knight v. State, 855 P.2d 1347, 1349-50 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993)).
602. Dollison, 5 P.3d at 247-48.
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also legally seize a Tylenol container found in the defendant’s
pocket that might contain evidence of that crime.603
In Fergerson v. State,604 the court of appeals affirmed the supe-
rior court’s finding that Fergerson’s sentence was not excessive or
clearly mistaken.605  Fergerson pleaded no contest to a single count
of second-degree theft for fraudulent use of a credit card.606  He
plea bargained for a thirty-month sentence with twenty-seven
months suspended, conceding two aggravating factors, and he
agreed to pay $55,640.87 in restitution.607  Less than two weeks after
serving this sentence, Fergerson was arrested again for second-
degree theft, a scheme to defraud, and contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor.608  He again reached a plea agreement with the
State receiving a two-year sentence, and the judge imposed his en-
tire prior twenty-seven month suspended term.609  The court of ap-
peals reiterated that it reviews sentences under the “clearly mis-
taken” standard rather than a sentencing de novo or the “principal
of parsimony.”610  The court also found that a probation violation
may indicate a poor prospect for rehabilitation, a finding of which
could indicate that the sentence may exceed the Austin611 limit.612
Therefore, the superior court’s sentencing above the Austin limit
was not excessive or clearly mistaken.613
In Foley v. State,614 the supreme court held that the defendant’s
maximum possible sentence was not excessive in light of his nu-
merous prior offenses and repeated failures at rehabilitation.615
Foley was observed driving erratically for several minutes before a
police officer attempted to pull him over.616  Before the officer
could do so, Foley ran off the road and stopped in the grass.617
Foley subsequently was determined to have a blood-alcohol level
603. See id. at 247.
604. No. A-7499, No. 4319, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 199, at *1 (Dec. 13, 2000).
605. See id. at *1.
606. See id. at *2.
607. See id. at *3.
608. See id.
609. See id. at *4-5.
610. See id. at *6.
611. Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (finding that a first
felony offender should normally be sentenced to a lesser sentence than would ap-
ply if the defendant were a second felony offender).
612. See Fergerson, No. A-7499, No. 4319, 2000 Alas. App. LEXIS 199, at *1.
613. See id. at *11.
614. 9 P.3d 1038 (Alaska 2000).
615. See id. at 1038.
616. See id. at 1038-40.
617. See id. at 1040.
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of 0.33 percent.618  The sentencing judge considered as aggravating
factors the fact that Foley had thirty criminal convictions in the
past twenty-five years,619 had an extremely high blood-alcohol level,
and was driving on a revoked license.620  The court concluded that
the sentencing judge gave the proper weight to Foley’s past record
in finding that he could neither be rehabilitated nor deterred;621
thus, the court held that the judge was not clearly mistaken in giv-
ing Foley the maximum sentence for his offense.622
In Griffin v. State,623 the court of appeals held that a twenty-
three-year prison sentence was not excessive when a defendant had
a prior history of theft and a demonstrated tendency toward violent
crimes.624  For at least fifteen years prior to the crimes in question,
Griffin had been convicted of various burglaries and felonies.625  On
June 19, 1998, he committed another burglary, and the trial court
identified aggravating factors for sentencing under Alaska Statutes
section 12.55.155(c), focusing on the seriousness of Griffin’s crimes
and his use of a dangerous weapon.626  Although the standard
Mutschler rule would only allow Griffin, as a person convicted of
multiple offenses, to receive a sentence equal to the maximum term
for the most serious offense, the trial judge imposed a sentence of
twenty-two to twenty-three years.627  The court of appeals upheld
this sentence based on “Griffin’s long criminal history, the serious-
ness of Griffin’s current offenses, and the apparent failure of all
prior attempts to supervise Griffin on probation and parole.”628
Further, the court indicated that, based on the supreme court’s
holding in State v. Bumpus,629 the excessiveness of a sentence de-
pends on the facts in question and in the present case the facts
showed that Griffin deserved his punishment.630
In Harmon v. State,631 the court of appeals affirmed separate
sentences for appellant’s convictions of second-degree sexual as-
sault and incest because the relevant statutes required proof of dif-
618. See id.
619. See id.
620. See id.
621. See id. at 1042.
622. See id.
623. 9 P.3d 301 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
624. See id. at 310.
625. See id. at 302.
626. See id. at 307 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(c) (LEXIS 2000)).
627. See id. at 307-08.
628. Id. at 308.
629. 820 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1991).
630. See Griffin, 9 P.3d. at 310.
631. 11 P.3d 393 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
YIR_FMT.DOC 04/24/01  12:03 PM
2001] THE YEAR IN REVIEW 123
ferent conduct and vindicated different social interests.632  The
court rejected appellant’s argument that the sentencing violated
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because the
sexual assault charge required the State to prove that appellant en-
gaged in sexual penetration with a person he knew to be incapaci-
tated, while incest required proof that appellant engaged in sexual
penetration with a blood relative.633  The court also affirmed that
the trial judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating factor, which re-
quires proof that appellant’s conduct was among the most serious
included in the definition of the offense, was not clearly erroneous
because the appellant assaulted his sister at night while she slept,
and his offense escalated to forcible rape when the sister woke up
and appellant choked her into unconsciousness.634  In addition, the
court did not consider the sentence excessive because of previous
sexual offense convictions and a lack of any statutory mitigating
factors.635
In State v. Delagarza,636 the court of appeals reversed a grant of
post-conviction relief to petitioner because his prior out-of-state
felony convictions were sufficiently similar to Alaska offenses to
qualify as felonies for presumptive sentencing purposes.637  Peti-
tioner had been convicted in Oregon of first-degree burglary, sec-
ond-degree burglary, and twice of second-degree robbery.638  Under
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155, an aggravating factor for pre-
sumptive sentencing is having three or more felony convictions.639
Pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 12.55.145(a)(1)(B), the appeals
court ruled that first-degree burglary in Oregon was “similar” to
second-degree burglary in Alaska, and that second-degree burglary
in both states had elements that were substantially identical.640  The
petitioner argued that Alaska’s second-degree robbery statute pe-
nalized assaultive conduct in the course of taking or attempting to
take property, focusing on a crime against the person, while the
corresponding Oregon statute emphasized theft, the taking of
property.641  The court rejected this argument by concluding that
632. See id. at 395.
633. See id.
634. See id. at 396.
635. See id.
636. 8 P.3d 362 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
637. See id. at 368.
638. See id. at 364.
639. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (LEXIS 2000)).
640. See id. at 365-66 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145(a)(1)(B) (LEXIS
2000)).
641. See id. at 367.
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the legislative history of Oregon’s robbery statutes indicated that
the Oregon legislature also intended to emphasize assault.642  In
comparing the crimes, the court noted that an out-of-state convic-
tion will be treated as a prior felony for presumptive sentencing if
its elements are more restrictive than the corresponding Alaska
statute, and that even if certain conduct would be penalized under
an Oregon statute but not an Alaska statute, that does not prevent
a conclusion that the elements of the two statutes are similar.643
In State v. Hodari,644 the supreme court upheld the trial court’s
fifty-five-year composite sentence, finding that the court of appeals
improperly relied on sentencing benchmarks as inflexible rules
rather than as starting points to reach its decision to overturn the
trial court’s sentence.645  Hodari was convicted of two counts of
first-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree robbery, and
one count of second-degree assault.646  The trial judge found that
Hodari’s long record of prior offenses and the heinousness of the
crime were aggravating factors that warranted a greater sentence
than forty-four years of “presumptive sentencing” established by
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.155.647  The supreme court found that
State v. Wentz648 implicitly rejected Williams v. State’s649 rigid sen-
tencing benchmarks relied on by the court of appeals, and empha-
sized the importance of the individualized nature of sentencing.650
Finally, the supreme court found that Hodari’s case presented a
“truly exceptional confluence of factors” showing in totality “an in-
grained compulsive criminal pattern” in his behavior that war-
ranted the trial court’s sentencing decision.651
In United States v. Scheele,652 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s failure to consider mar-
gin of error when it arrived at a quantity of drugs upon which to
base a sentence constituted error, but that the district court did not
err when it applied an obstruction of justice adjustment to the sen-
tence based on the testimony of an officer, who had heard a tape of
642. See id.
643. See id. at 366-67.
644. 996 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 2000).
645. See id. at 1237.
646. See id. at 1232.
647. See id. at 1233-34 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (LEXIS 2000)).
648. 805 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1991).
649. 800 P.2d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
650. See Hodari, 996 P.2d at 1234.
651. Id. at 1237.
652. 231 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the defendant threatening a witness.653  Scheele was indicted for
manufacturing, distributing, and attempting to manufacture meth-
amphetamine.654  The testimony varied as to the amount of drugs
attributable to Scheele.655  Weighing the various statements made
by Scheele as to the amount of drugs he produced, the judge ar-
rived at a sum of 3040.98 kg.656  Pursuant to the sentencing guide-
lines, the amount was just 40.98 kg above the threshold for a base
offense level of thirty-four.657  The court of appeals held that, al-
though the district court made every attempt to be fair in its esti-
mation, it “failed to err on the side of caution.”658  Since taking the
margin of error into account could have reduced Scheele’s base of-
fense level to the next lowest level, the court of appeals held that
the district court’s failure to do so constituted error.659  Finally, the
court held that the adjustment to the sentence for obstruction of
justice was not erroneous because nothing in the record suggested
that the testimony of the officer was unreliable, and because the
statements made by Scheele were sufficiently threatening to sup-
port such a finding.660
4. Miscellaneous.  In Fuzzard v. State,661 the court of appeals
held that evidence of prior acts of domestic violence were admissi-
ble under Alaska Rules of Evidence 404(b)(1) and (b)(4).662  James
Fuzzard threatened to kill Bobbi Jo Murphy.663  He was arrested
and indicted for third-degree assault.664  Fuzzard asked for a protec-
tive order that would prohibit the State from admitting evidence of
previous episodes of domestic violence against Murphy.665  The
court held that the admission of the prior episodes did not “place
him at unreasonable risk of conviction” because Fuzzard had other
opportunities to impeach Murphy’s testimony about these events.666
Additionally, the admission of the prior acts comported with the
653. See id. at 499-500.
654. See id. at 495.
655. See id.
656. See id. at 496-97.
657. See id.
658. Id. at 498.
659. See id. at 499-500.
660. See id. at 500.
661. 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
662. See id. at 1163.
663. See id. at 1164.
664. See id.
665. See id.
666. Id. at 1167.
YIR_FMT.DOC 04/24/01  12:03 PM
126 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [18:1
legislative purpose of the rules.667  Fuzzard also argued that the evi-
dence rules violated the equal protection clause.668  The court re-
jected this argument because Fuzzard failed to show that the rules
infringed on a fundamental right.669
In Hosier v. State,670 the court of appeals held that the trial
court did not err by allowing the State to amend an indictment to
conform to the evidence, failing to inform the defendant of a note
received from the jury during trial, and allowing the State to play a
tape recording of an interview between the defendant and police
that contained references to the defendant’s prior criminal acts.671
The defendant Donald Hosier was convicted on several counts of
second-degree forgery and one count of second-degree theft for
forging another person’s name on several checks drawn from an
account at Key Bank.672  Although Hosier’s indictment mistakenly
identified the bank as “First Bank,” the trial judge allowed the
State to amend the indictment to name the correct bank.673  The
court of appeals upheld the amendment because the identity of the
bank was not a material element of the forgery charge.674  In addi-
tion, the court held that Hosier was not prejudiced by the trial
judge’s failure to inform him of a jury note requesting the prosecu-
tor to speak more slowly and the defense attorney to speak more
loudly.675  The court concluded that it was clear from the record
that the judge conveyed the jury’s requests to the attorneys, and
that the jury note did not directly involve the merits of the litiga-
tion or the jury’s duties in deciding the case.676  The court also held
it was not error to admit the tape recording containing Hosier’s
prior criminal acts because the trial judge adequately cautioned the
jury against the potentially objectionable portions of the recording,
and Hosier failed to preserve his objection to playing the tape.677
In Plyler v. State,678 the court of appeals held that a defendant
who files for post-conviction relief challenging a criminal convic-
tion does not have the right to a peremptory challenge of the judge
667. See id.
668. See id.
669. See id. at 1167-68.
670. 1 P.3d 107 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
671. See id. at 108.
672. See id.
673. See id.
674. See id. at 109.
675. See id. at 110.
676. See id.
677. See id. at 111-12.
678. 10 P.3d 1173 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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who presided over the trial.679  Plyler was found guilty of first-
degree murder.680  He later filed an application for post-conviction
relief, claiming he had received ineffective assistance of counsel,
and tried to change judges using a peremptory challenge.681  The
court of appeals, relying on other jurisdictions that had considered
similar cases, held that Plyler did not have a right to the peremp-
tory challenge, because the change in judge would foster an unnec-
essary delay.682  The court held that a new judge would have to be-
come familiar with all the intricacies of the case, and that it would
be difficult for a new judge to determine the credibility and de-
meanor of the witnesses simply by examining the record of the
case.683
In Semaken v. State,684 the court of appeals affirmed a convic-
tion of a misdemeanor: failing to make an annual report to the De-
partment of Public Safety, pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
12.63.010.685  Having been convicted in 1990 of sexual assault, Se-
maken was required to register as a sex offender and annually re-
port his current address and other information.686  At the time this
case arose, the Department of Public Safety’s regulation required
sex offenders to submit an annual report thirty days prior to their
birthday.687  Semaken was stopped for a traffic violation three days
after his birthday and charged with the misdemeanor of failing to
report.688  Semaken argued that Alaska Statutes section 12.63.010
requires the Department of Public Safety to establish an individu-
alized annual reporting schedule rather than impose a general
rule.689  The court of appeals disagreed, and, noting that Semaken
had been well aware of the regulation prior to the traffic stop, af-
firmed his conviction.690
In Thompson v. State,691 the court of appeals affirmed the rul-
ing of the superior court, which dismissed Thompson’s Rule 33 mo-
tion, his appeal for a reduction in sentence, and his motion to ap-
679. See id. at 1176.
680. See id. at 1173.
681. See id. at 1173-74.
682. See id. at 1174-75.
683. See id. at 1175.
684. 8 P.3d 368 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
685. See id. at 370 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (LEXIS 2000)).
686. See id. at 369.
687. See id.
688. See id.
689. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.63.010 (LEXIS 2000)).
690. See id. at 369-70.
691. 13 P.3d 276 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
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point counsel.692  Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder
for killing his ex-wife.693  In 1996, he sought post-conviction relief.694
The court of appeals remanded to the superior court to determine
whether Thompson was denied the right to testify.695  Thompson
then filed a motion for a new trial under Alaska Criminal Rule
33.696  Thompson’s motion was not timely, and the court dismissed
his motion, along with his motions for reduction of sentence and
appointment of new counsel.697  On appeal, the court concluded
that Alaska Statutes section 12.72.020 did not apply to Thompson’s
motion for a new trial.698  Further, the court concluded that Thomp-
son did not fall under an exception to the 120-day time limit for
filing a motion to reduce the sentence.699  Finally, the court held
that Thompson’s motion to appoint counsel was untimely.700
In Ward v. State,701 the court of appeals upheld the trial court’s
decision to select a jury in Fairbanks rather than renewing its un-
successful efforts to select a jury in Fort Yukon.702  The defendant
Thomas Ward and his father got into a fight, and the defendant’s
ex-girlfriend tried to stop them.703  During the struggle, Ward hit his
ex-girlfriend in the head with an axe, causing his arrest for as-
sault.704  Before trial in Fort Yukon, the trial judge made several
unsuccessful efforts to empanel a sufficient number of jurors to
hear the case.705  The trial judge decided not to attempt to contact
the potential jurors that did not respond to the summons or the ra-
dio messages, and instead elected to return the case to Fairbanks
for jury selection.706  After a trial in Fairbanks with a new judge and
jury, Ward was convicted of third-degree assault.707  The court of
appeals affirmed Ward’s conviction, finding that the trial judge un-
dertook reasonable efforts to obtain a jury in Fort Yukon.708  The
692. See id. at 278.
693. See id. at 276.
694. See id. at 277.
695. See id. at 277-78.
696. See id. at 278.
697. See id.
698. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.020 (LEXIS 2000)).
699. See id.
700. See id.
701. 997 P.2d 528 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
702. See id.
703. See id. at 528-29.
704. See id.
705. See id. at 529.
706. See id.
707. See id.
708. See id. at 531-32.
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court found that although it might have been possible to locate ad-
ditional prospective jurors to complete jury selection, the process
undertaken revealed widespread familial and personal relation-
ships between the prospective jurors and the participants in the al-
leged assault, and that the jury pool had extensive knowledge of
the incident itself.709  The court upheld the trial court’s ruling to re-
ject Ward’s proposed jury instructions on transferred intent and
self-defense because they were superfluous.710
VII.  EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Discrimination
In Era Aviation, Inc. v. Lindfors,711 the supreme court affirmed
a jury verdict against Era Aviation (“Era”) for discrimination and
retaliation in a case where a female pilot alleged sex discrimination
and retaliation after she filed a human rights violation complaint.712
The court held that although the jury instruction was erroneously
worded for this type of discrimination case, the jury instruction was
equally favorable to Era as the one Era had requested.713  Addi-
tionally, because the jury instruction did not prejudice Era, it did
not constitute reversible error.714  The court held that separate
submission of discrimination, retaliation, and constructive dis-
charge claims was appropriate, and the fact that the jury rejected
the constructive discharge claim did not impact the other claims.715
The court also held that testimony offered by another employee
about the conduct of an officer was appropriately admitted because
there was “sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to infer
that Birmingham was one of the decisionmakers in Era’s retaliation
against Lindfors.”716  The court further found that the punitive
damages award of $750,000 was excessive and remanded the case
for remittitur to $500,000.717  The court held it was appropriate for
the jury to determine whether Lindfors qualified as a professional
under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act for purposes of determining
whether overtime pay was due.718  The court concluded that a risk
709. See id. at 531.
710. See id. at 532.
711. 17 P.3d 40 (Alaska 2000).
712. See id. at 52.
713. See id. at 46.
714. See id.
715. See id. at 47.
716. Id. at 48.
717. See id. at 49.
718. See id. at 50.
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enhancement or lodestar multiplier was not required, because
Lindfors had neither shown she was a public interest plaintiff nor
that her attorneys would not be compensated beyond the fees
awarded by the court.719
B. Labor Law
In Alaska Contracting & Consulting, Inc. v. Department of La-
bor,720 the supreme court held that the Department of Labor (the
“Department”) had authority to determine that a contracting com-
pany was a “liable employer” under the Alaska Employment Secu-
rity Act, notwithstanding a prior determination, and that the De-
partment’s liability determination was supported by substantial
evidence.721  The Alaska Employment Security Act requires em-
ployers to pay contributions to the Department for an unemploy-
ment compensation fund each year that the employers are subject
to the Act.722  Alaska Contracting engages in “lease-back” opera-
tions whereby “lease-drivers” operate the company’s equipment to
perform certain duties in construction projects.723  In 1996, Depart-
ment Hearing Officer Jenkins ruled that Alaska Contracting was
liable under the Act for contributions after April 1, 1993, despite a
1990 notice of “non-liability.”724  The supreme court held that the
1996 ruling was not barred by collateral estoppel because the issue
was not actually litigated, which is a prerequisite for preclusion.725
The supreme court also held that Alaska Statutes section
23.20.315(a) authorizes the Department to “determine coverage for
a new period, even if its new coverage determination differs from a
previous coverage determination.”726  Further, no new evidence was
required under Alaska Statutes section 23.20.315(b) to redetermine
a Department ruling, because the “1996 liability ruling decided
Alaska Contracting’s coverage status and liability for new tax peri-
ods not covered by the 1990 non-liability determination.”727  Fi-
nally, the supreme court held that the Department did not err in
finding Alaska Contracting liable as a employer, because the lease-
drivers provided a “service” to Alaska Contracting, and because
Alaska Contracting was not exempt under the three-part “ABC
719. See id. at 50-51.
720. 8 P.3d 340 (Alaska 2000).
721. See id. at 351.
722. See id. at 342.
723. See id. at 343.
724. See id. at 344.
725. See id. at 345.
726. Id. at 346 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.315(a) (LEXIS 2000)).
727. Id. at 347 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.315(b) (LEXIS 2000)).
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test.”728  The court affirmed the Department’s ruling that part B of
the test was not met because the lease-drivers dirt hauling was
within the usual course of business for Alaska Contracting.729  The
court also affirmed that part C of the test was not met, because
each lease-driver was not “customarily engaged in an independ-
ently established trade,” since Alaska Contracting provided many
of the lease-drivers with insurance on the trucks.730
In Cassel v. Department of Administration,731 the supreme
court affirmed a superior court ruling that the termination of a
probationary employee was proper, because the termination con-
formed to the objective standards required by the collective bar-
gaining agreement.732  The court further affirmed the denial of back
pay, finding that the employee was not deprived of his due process
rights in the post-termination procedures.733  James Cassel was dis-
missed from his position as the Department of Public Safety’s Iden-
tification Bureau Chief after receiving an unacceptable perform-
ance rating from his supervisor during his twelve-month
probationary period.734  Applying the standard set forth in Univer-
sity of Alaska v. Tovsen,735 the court concluded that the collective
bargaining agreement permitted termination “only when a proba-
tionary employee has failed to satisfy objective standards of per-
formance.”736  The court then held that the Hearing Officer prop-
erly concluded that unsatisfactory performance of duties
constituted just cause for termination by applying an objective
standard, despite relying on the evaluation of Cassel’s supervisor.737
Finally, the court held that the post-termination procedures did not
violate Cassel’s due process rights because they were fair, reason-
able, efficacious, and in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement.738  Thus, the court found that he was properly denied
back pay.739
In Cavin v. Department of Public Safety,740 the supreme court
reversed the superior court holding that Cavin was not a “seaman”
728. See id. at 351.
729. See id. at 350.
730. Id.
731. 14 P.3d 278 (Alaska 2000).
732. See id. at 285.
733. See id. at 287.
734. See id. at 281.
735. 835 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1992).
736. Cassel, 14 P.3d at 283-84.
737. See id. at 284-85.
738. See id. at 287.
739. See id.
740. 3 P.3d 323 (Alaska 2000).
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under the Jones Act and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.741  Cavin, an employee of the Alaska Department of Public
Safety, Fish and Wildlife Protection Division, brought suit under
the Jones Act to recover federal maritime remedies for injuries he
suffered while working on state vessels.742  Cavin alleged “claims of
Jones Act negligence, general maritime negligence, unseaworthi-
ness, and maintenance and cure.”743  Because Cavin did not spend
at least thirty percent of his time working solely on boat duty, the
superior court found that he did not meet the temporal require-
ment for time spent working on vessels, and thus did not qualify as
a “seaman” under the Jones Act.744  The supreme court remanded
because the superior court failed to consider Cavin’s employment
between 1983-87.745  The supreme court also remanded for consid-
eration of whether Cavin qualified as a “seasonal seaman” under
the Jones Act.746  Finally, the supreme court noted that, if on re-
mand the superior court could not find recovery under the Jones
Act, Cavin’s unseaworthiness claim should still proceed to trial,
unless barred by the statue of limitations.747
In Sever v. NLRB and Alaska Pulp Corporation v. NLRB,748
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Alaska
Pulp Corporation had the right to reinstate strikers in any nondis-
criminatory order, including merit.749  Further, the court held that
Alaska Pulp must be given an opportunity to prove that the em-
ployees who voluntarily resigned for pension benefits had severed
the employment relationship unequivocally and were not due back
pay or reinstatement.750  Following an economic strike, the National
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) found that Alaska Pulp had
committed various unfair labor practices because of the methods it
employed when rehiring the striking workers.751  Additionally, sev-
eral of the strikers were not offered reinstatement because they ac-
cepted an offer by Alaska Pulp of a lump sum payment of pension
benefits in exchange for voluntary resignation.752  In the first mat-
741. See id. at 324.
742. See id. at 324-25.
743. Id. at 325.
744. See id. at 325-26.
745. See id. at 328.
746. See id. at 329-30.
747. See id. at 332.
748. 231 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2000).
749. See id. at 1167.
750. See id. at 1169-70.
751. See id. at 1159-64.
752. See id. at 1161.
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ter, the court of appeals found that the NLRB had erred when it
forced Alaska Pulp to use seniority in determining the amount of
back pay it owed the workers.753  The court held that, under the
controlling Lone Star case,754 an employer could recall workers us-
ing any nondiscriminatory method it wanted, thus permitting its
use of merit.755  The court also found that accepting pension bene-
fits did not express an employee’s intention to quit.756  Instead, the
court held that, on remand, the NLRB needed to consider whether
Alaska Pulp met its burden under the Augusta Bakery case757 test
“to prove that each employee who resigned expressed an une-
quivocal intent to sever his or her relationship with the com-
pany.”758
In Wescott v. State,759 the supreme court held that the Depart-
ment of Labor (the “Department”) failed to consider adequately
the risk an individual’s work posed to his health as a factor in de-
termining whether he could receive “waiting week” unemployment
benefits.760  Wescott was a drilling roustabout at Alaska Petroleum
Contractors when he had surgery on his club foot.761  Although
Wescott’s physician eventually gave him a full medical release, he
recommended Wescott get a job that did not require prolonged
standing and walking.762  Wescott later quit his job and applied for
unemployment benefits under the Alaska Employment Security
Act.763  The Department’s Division of Employment Security in-
formed Wescott that he would not receive benefits for his first six
weeks of unemployment (waiting week benefits), because he vol-
untarily left suitable work without good cause.764  The supreme
court held that the Department failed to consider the degree of risk
to Wescott’s health and safety that his work presented.765  The court
held that a job which a worker is physically capable of performing
may be unsuitable if it is detrimental to the worker’s health.766
753. See id. at 1165.
754. 279 N.L.R.B. 550 (1986).
755. See Sever, 231 F.3d. at. 1167.
756. See id. at 1168.
757. 298 N.L.R.B. 58 (1990), enforced sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Augusta Bakery,
Corp., 957 F.2d 1467 (7th Cir. 1992).
758. Sever, 231 F.3d at 1170.
759. 996 P.2d 723 (Alaska 2000).
760. See id. at 723-24.
761. See id. at 724.
762. See id.
763. See id. at 725.
764. See id.
765. See id. at 727.
766. See id. at 727-28.
YIR_FMT.DOC 04/24/01  12:03 PM
134 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [18:1
C. Workers’ Compensation
In Berger v. Wein Air Alaska,767 the supreme court reversed the
Workers’ Compensation Board’s decision not to allow amounts
payable by an employer to offset an employer’s portion of a third-
party tort award.768  The supreme court remanded for reconsidera-
tion the reduction amount of the employer’s credit.769  Berger, a
flight attendant for Wein Air Alaska, suffered injuries from a plane
crash and settled a workers’ compensation claim against Wein Air,
leaving Wein Air liable for any future medical expenses.770  In a
previous suit against the State of Alaska, Wein Air claimed a credit
from the recovery.771  When Berger eventually sought further bene-
fits from Wein Air for additional medical expenses, Wein Air
claimed it still had credit from the tort suit that had not been offset
by medical expenses paid by collateral sources.772  The supreme
court held that, although collateral sources paid the expenses, Wein
Air’s credit was still offset by the amount of the expenses, because
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015(g) allows a reduction of credit by
all amounts payable by the employer.773  If the collateral sources
had not paid the expenses, Wein Air would have been liable for
payment under Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015(g).774
In Bloom v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,775 the supreme
court reversed the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s deci-
sion to deny Bloom’s request to change attending physicians with-
out the permission of his employer.776  Bloom injured his back while
working for his employer, Tekton, Inc.777  Bloom had two surgeries
but continued experiencing back pain.778  Bloom visited another
doctor, but was dissatisfied with the assessment.779  He then re-
quested permission from Tekton’s insurance adjuster to seek a sec-
ond opinion, but his request was denied.780  Bloom tried to schedule
another appointment with the original physician, but the doctor
767. 995 P.2d 240 (Alaska 2000).
768. See id. at 241.
769. See id.
770. See id.
771. See id.
772. See id.
773. See id. at 242.
774. See id.
775. 5 P.3d 235 (Alaska 2000).
776. See id. at 236.
777. See id.
778. See id.
779. See id. at 237.
780. See id.
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was unavailable to see Bloom.781  Tekton later permitted Bloom to
seek a second opinion, but refused to allow him to see the doctor of
his choice.782  The court held that, since the physician referred by
Tekton was either unavailable or unwilling to treat him, Bloom had
a right to name a new attending physician pursuant to Alaska Stat-
utes section 23.30.095(a) without obtaining his employer’s permis-
sion.783
In Carlson v. Doyon Universal-Ogden Services,784 the supreme
court held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board did not
err in finding that an employee was not entitled to Permanent To-
tal Disability (“PTD”) benefits, because the employer adequately
showed that regular and continuous employment was available to
the employee.785  Carlson injured her back while working as a
housekeeper for the appellees.786  Carlson became ineligible for the
Temporary Total Disability benefits she had been receiving, be-
cause her condition eventually stabilized.787  Therefore, she applied
for PTD benefits.788  The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act pre-
sumes that the employee’s claim is compensable, so the employer
must rebut the presumption for PTD with substantial evidence to
the contrary.789  Although Carlson presented testimony supporting
her claim that she could not work,790 the court held that she did not
prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the
employer presented substantial evidence that Carlson did not
qualify.791  Therefore, the court affirmed the Board’s decision to
deny PTD benefits.792
In DeYonge v. NANA/Marriott,793 the supreme court rejected a
distinction between aggravation of symptoms and aggravation of
the underlying impairment to reverse the denial of benefits to a
worker with a pre-existing arthritic condition exacerbated by her
job.794  Judy DeYonge’s job as a housekeeper for NANA/Marriott
781. See id.
782. See id.
783. See id. at 239.
784. 995 P.2d 224 (Alaska 2000).
785. See id. at 226.
786. See id.
787. See id.
788. See id.
789. See id. at 227.
790. See id. at 228.
791. See id. at 228-229.
792. See id. at 231.
793. 1 P.3d 90 (Alaska 2000).
794. See id. at 92.
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required that she kneel, bend, and stoop when cleaning.795  Pain in
DeYonge’s knees became so intense from this work that she left
her job.796  The Workers’ Compensation Board denied her claim on
the premise that job must worsen the underlying condition, not just
the symptoms, to be compensable.797  The supreme court held that
under Alaska law, once DeYonge showed “some evidence” that
the injury was related to her job, a presumption of compensability
applies.798  In order for NANA/Marriott to rebut this presumption,
it would have to provide substantial evidence of an alternative ex-
planation that excluded work factors as the cause of the impair-
ment or eliminate any reasonable possibility that the job caused the
disability.799  The court held that NANA/Marriott did not provide
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability, and
the Board’s decision was reversed and remanded. 800
In Doyon Universal Services v. Allen,801 the supreme court af-
firmed the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board’s finding that an
employee’s injury arose in the scope of his employment and his
work-related injury was a substantial factor in causing his disabil-
ity.802  Lawrence Allen was employed by Doyon at a remote site on
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline.803  On August 21, 1997, Allen ate a din-
ner that included Brussels sprouts at the company cafeteria, which
was the only eating establishment available at his workplace.804
Later that evening, Allen suffered acute abdominal pain, accompa-
nied by vomiting and severe diarrhea.805  On August 23, 1997, Allen
was flown to the Alaska Native Medical Center, where it was de-
termined that he had a bowel obstruction caused by two bezoars
containing traces of undigested Brussels sprouts.806  Allen filed an
injury report with Doyon on September 5, 1997, and Doyon re-
sponded by filing notice that it would not pay Allen benefits, since
his injuries did not arise in the course and scope of his employ-
ment.807  Allen then filed an Application of Adjustment of Claim
795. See id.
796. See id.
797. See id. at 93.
798. See id. at 95.
799. See id. at 96.
800. See id. at 98.
801. 999 P.2d 764 (Alaska 2000).
802. See id. at 771.
803. See id. at 766.
804. See id.
805. See id.
806. See id. at 767.
807. See id.
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with the Department of Labor.808  The Alaska Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board held a hearing on May 12, 1998, and the Board deter-
mined that Allen’s intestinal obstruction was a compensable in-
jury.809  The supreme court agreed with the Board’s determination
that the Brussels sprouts were a substantial factor in causing Al-
len’s injury because Allen’s eating options were strictly limited to
his employer’s facilities at a remote site.810  Allen was entitled to
compensation, because the disability would not have happened but
for an injury sustained in the course and scope of employment, and
because reasonable persons would regard the injury as the cause of
disability.811
In Steffey v. Municipality of Anchorage,812 the supreme court
held that, where a defendant employer presents substantial evi-
dence that work was not a substantial factor in causing the aggrava-
tion of an injury, and plaintiff fails to prove his claim by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the employer does not have to pay
workers’ compensation benefits under Alaska Statutes section
23.30.095.813  Instead, the supreme court applied Alaska Adminis-
trative Code title 8, section 45.082(f) to limit the payment require-
ment.814  In 1992, Robert Steffey suffered two work-related injuries,
and the Municipality of Anchorage paid for his chiropractic care
until April 1995.815  Steffey claimed that he should continue receiv-
ing care for eight work-related injuries that aggravated the original
injury.816  The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (the
“Board”) rejected his claim because it found that Steffey had not
sustained a compensable injury on any of the eight occasions.817  On
appeal, the superior court and the supreme court affirmed the
Board’s decision, holding that the Board had overcome a presump-
tion that the injury was compensable by presenting evidence that
“either 1) provides an alternative explanation which, if accepted,
would exclude work related factors as a substantial cause of the
[aggravation or acceleration]; or 2) directly eliminates any reason-
808. See id.
809. See id.
810. See id. at 770.
811. See id.
812. 1 P.3d 685 (Alaska 2000).
813. See id. at 691-92.
814. See id. at 692.
815. See id. at 687.
816. See id. at 688.
817. See id. at 689.
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able possibility that employment was a factor in causing the [aggra-
vation or acceleration].”818
D. Miscellaneous
In Egemo v. Egemo Construction Co.,819 the supreme court
held that the two-year statute of limitations to file a claim for time-
loss benefits does not begin to run until the injured employee both
experiences actual disablement from the injury and knows of the
disability’s full effect on the employee’s earning capacity.820  Be-
cause Egemo’s doctor told him he would someday need surgery to
correct a leg deformity sustained in a work-related accident, the in-
surer claimed that Egemo knew of his impending disability more
than ten years before filing his claim.821  The supreme court rejected
the insurer’s arguments, holding that disablement occurred only
when Egemo sustained wage losses because of his inability to work
following corrective surgery.822  The court also decided that previ-
ous disablement from the same injury did not disqualify Egemo’s
claim.823
VIII.  FAMILY LAW
A. Child Support
In Atcherian v. Child Support Enforcement Division,824 the su-
preme court affirmed the superior court’s order that entitled Atch-
erian to a refund of child support collected after his motion to va-
cate a paternity judgment.825  Pursuant to a default judgment of
paternity filed against Atcherian, the Child Support Enforcement
Division (“CSED”) ordered Atcherian to pay child support.826
However, a paternity test disproved Atcherian’s paternity and the
superior court vacated the paternity judgment.827  The court did not
grant Atcherian full restitution, but required CSED to reimburse
him for any child support collected after the date he moved to va-
cate his paternity judgment.828  On appeal, the supreme court held
818. Id. at 690-91.
819. 998 P.2d 434 (Alaska 2000).
820. See id. at 440.
821. See id. at 439.
822. See id.
823. See id. at 439-40.
824. 14 P.3d 970 (Alaska 2000).
825. See id. at 977.
826. See id. at 972.
827. See id. at 973.
828. See id.
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that, without any impropriety on the part of CSED in establishing
or collecting child support, a father whose paternity has been dis-
proved cannot require the CSED to repay funds that it has already
disbursed for the benefit of the child.829  Because there was no mis-
conduct on the part of CSED, the order of the superior court was
affirmed.830
In Bennett v. Bennett,831 the supreme court held that, under
Turinsky v. Long,832 child support awards “should follow custody
orders.”833  When Rita and Albert Bennett divorced, Rita was
granted primary custody.834  However, a motion to modify custody
was made when one of the children went to live with Albert.835  This
arrangement did not work, and the child then lived with Rita while
Albert had de jure custody.836  Rita then moved to modify the cus-
tody order again, and requested custody and child support for the
time the child lived with her while Albert had legal custody.837  The
court affirmed the decision of the superior court to deny Rita this
child support reimbursement because Turinsky requires child sup-
port to follow court-ordered custody rather than de facto custody.838
However, the court found that the trial court abused its discretion
in retroactively awarding child support to Albert while the child
lived with Rita.839  Such an award was violative of the purpose of
child support payments, which is to benefit the child.840
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. Button,841 the su-
preme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the Child
Support Enforcement Division (“CSED”) could not collect child
support payments that were in arrears because Button adequately
rebutted the presumption of paternity at the first formal opportu-
nity.842  In 1986, Button acknowledged his paternity of Vickie Han-
sen and paid child support.843  However, he subsequently discov-
ered that he was not Vickie’s biological father and discontinued the
829. See id. at 975-76.
830. See id. at 976, 977.
831. 6 P.3d 724 (Alaska 2000).
832. 910 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996).
833. Bennett, 6 P.3d at 725.
834. See id. at 725.
835. See id.
836. See id.
837. See id. at 725-26.
838. See id. at 727.
839. See id. at 728.
840. See id. at 727-28.
841. 7 P.3d 74 (Alaska 2000).
842. See id. at 75.
843. See id.
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support payments.844  In 1995, the CSED notified Button that he
was in arrears for $40,684 of public assistance that had been paid
on Vickie’s behalf.845  The superior court disestablished Button’s
paternity after tests confirmed he was not the biological father,
which relieved him of any ongoing support obligations and the
amount in arrears.846  The court affirmed the superior court’s hold-
ing that the CSED had never issued a valid support order because
Button requested a formal hearing to contest the order within the
statutorily allotted time period.847  Because a valid support order
was not issued before Button disestablished paternity, he did not
owe the amount in arrears.848
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. Leitch,849 the su-
preme court held that the Child Support Enforcement Division
(“CSED”) had the authority to request modification of a child
support order against the obligee of the order when a change in
physical custody had occurred, but the order had not been
changed.850  McKinnon and Leitch are the parents of a minor
child.851  After the court granted physical custody to Leitch and or-
dered McKinnon to pay child support, McKinnon took physical
custody of the minor at various times, receiving public assistance
for the child during those periods.852  The CSED moved to modify
the child support order to obtain payments from Leitch for the
public assistance received by McKinnon when the child was in his
custody.853  Alaska Statutes section 25.27.045 allows CSED to seek
modification of a support order “upon application of an obligee or
at the agency’s own discretion if the obligor is liable to the state
under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.120(a) or (b).”854  The court de-
fined the term “obligor” as a person owing a duty of support that is
imposed or imposable by law or by court order.855  Although Leitch
was not the obligor under the child support order, she was an obli-
844. See id.
845. See id.
846. See id. at 75-76.
847. See id. at 76-77.
848. See id. at 77.
849. 999 P.2d 782 (Alaska 2000).
850. See id. at 784.
851. See id. at 782.
852. See id.
853. See id.
854. Id. at 783 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.045 (LEXIS 2000)).  Alaska
Statutes section 25.27.120 allows CSED to seek reimbursement for public assis-
tance received by a parent who is required to pay child support.  See ALASKA
STAT. § 25.27.045 (LEXIS 2000).
855. See Leitch, 999 P.2d at 783.
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gor under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.045 because liability for
support could potentially be imposed on her.856  The court held that
given the broad power and authority granted to CSED, the legisla-
ture did not intend to prevent CSED from seeking modification of
child support orders where physical custody of the child has
changed but the actual order has not.857  Therefore, CSED had the
authority to initiate a modification proceeding against Leitch.858
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. McCormick,859 the
supreme court held that a custodial parent’s motion to extend the
duration of child support beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday
does not require a showing of changed circumstances under Alaska
Statutes section 25.24.170(a) and its 1992 amendment.860  Larry
McCormick and his ex-wife Colleen divorced in 1992, after a statu-
tory amendment had been passed allowing a court to extend sup-
port to eighteen-year-old children upon a motion by either party.861
Although the original child support order did not provide for post-
majority support, the Child Support Enforcement Division moved
in 1999 to increase Larry’s support payments and also to extend the
duration of the payments past the children’s eighteenth birthdays.862
The court held that if the original order did not expressly exclude
such support and the child meets the statute’s requirements of be-
ing unmarried, pursuing a high school diploma, and living depen-
dently with a parent or guardian, then post-majority support of an
eighteen-year-old child will be extended in all but the most excep-
tional cases.863
In Child Support Enforcement Division v. Pealatere,864 the su-
preme court held that the Child Support Enforcement Division
(“CSED”) was not entitled to reimbursement of public assistance
under Alaska Statutes section 25.27.120(a) because the child sup-
port offset agreement approved by the superior court served the
child’s best interests.865  In the Pealatere’s divorce decree, custody
of their minor son was granted to Ralph Pealatere, and Kathy
Pealatere’s child support obligations were waived in exchange for
her relinquishment of her marital property claims in her husband’s
856. See id.
857. See id. at 784.
858. See id.
859. 3 P.3d 930 (Alaska 2000).
860. See id. at 930-31.
861. See id. at 930 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170 (LEXIS 2000)).
862. See id.
863. See id. at 931.
864. 996 P.2d 84 (Alaska 2000).
865. See id. at 85-86.
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tools.866  After the Pealatere’s son received aid from the state,
CSED sought reimbursement from Kathy Pealatere for the public
assistance.867  Although CSED v. Green held that CSED had an in-
dependent statutory right to recoup such costs, 868 the supreme court
found an exception to this rule when CSED’s right to reimburse-
ment should yield to equitable considerations.869  The court af-
firmed the superior court’s decision to allow the defendant Kathy
Pealatere to offset her child support obligation by relinquishing her
interest in a portion of the marital property because the offset pre-
served the custodial parent’s means of support and was therefore in
the child’s best interests.870  However, the court reversed the valua-
tion of the offset because the lower court did not account for Mr.
Pealatere’s share of the marital property.871
In Child Support Recovery Services, Inc. v. Inn at the Water-
front,872 the supreme court affirmed summary judgment for the Inn
at the Waterfront, holding that the Inn did not owe the Child Sup-
port Recovery Services (“CSRS”) certain wages withheld from one
of its employees.873  The Inn at the Waterfront employed Cullinane,
a non-custodial parent who was delinquent on child support pay-
ments.874  The Alaska Child Support Enforcement Division made
efforts to collect the payments, including three Orders to Withhold
[Income] and Deliver Property (“WID”) in accordance with
Alaska Statutes section 25.27.260.875  However, Cullinane later fully
paid the child support in full satisfaction of his outstanding obliga-
tions.876  The court found that the Inn’s liability for failure to com-
ply with the WIDs was “joint and several with Cullinane’s [liabil-
ity].”877  Therefore, the Inn did not owe CSRS any money since its
obligation ended with Cullinane’s.878
In Schuyler v. Briner,879 the supreme court held that an in-
crease in a father’s child support payments without a hearing was
improper where the father alleged that his rise in income was solely
866. See id. at 85.
867. See id.
868. 983 P.2d 1249 (Alaska 1999).
869. See Pealatere, 996 P.2d at 87.
870. See id.
871. See id.
872. 7 P.3d 63 (Alaska 2000).
873. See id. at 64.
874. See id.
875. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.260 (LEXIS 2000).
876. See id. at 65.
877. Id. at 73.
878. See id.
879. 13 P.3d 738 (Alaska 2000).
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attributable to overtime worked in an effort to provide for his new
family.880  Pursuant to a divorce agreement, Bill Schuyler had been
paying child support to his former wife Florence Briner for their
daughter, Valerie.881  In September 1999, the Child Support En-
forcement Division (“CSED”) moved for an increase in Bill’s child
support payments based on its review of his income information.882
The supreme court held that the superior court should have con-
sidered Bill’s efforts to provide for his new family as a defense to
the upward modification, because the commentary to Alaska Civil
Rule 90.3 provides that “the interests of the subsequent family may
be taken into account as a defense to a modification action where
an obligor proves he or she has . . . increased his or her income spe-
cifically to better provide for a subsequent family.”883
The court next held that the lower court did not err in denying
a hearing for modified custody where the father failed to demon-
strate a substantial change in circumstances affecting the child’s
welfare.884  The supreme court reasoned that Bill failed to establish
that a change in custody would be in Valerie’s best interests.885  The
court reasoned that Valerie’s new living arrangement with her
brother did not necessitate a custody modification in order to serve
her best interests, because both Florence and Bill had agreed that
Valerie should live with her brother.886
B. Child Custody
In A.B. v. Department of Health and Social Services,887 the su-
preme court remanded a parental rights case for determinations
regarding whether parental rights were terminated in accordance
with the relevant statute.888  Under Alaska Statutes section
47.10.088(a), parental rights may be terminated “for purposes of
freeing a child for adoption or other permanent placement.”889  The
court must find the child to be “in need of aid” under Alaska Stat-
utes section 47.10.011 and that the parent “has not remedied the
conduct or conditions that place the child at risk.”890  The court
880. See id. at 745.
881. See id. at 740.
882. See id.
883. Id. at 743 (citing Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3, commentary VI.B.2).
884. See id. at 745.
885. See id. at 742.
886. See id.
887. 7 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
888. See id. at 953-54.
889. Id. at 950.
890. Id.
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must also consider the best interests of the child and must find that
the Division of Family and Youth Services (“DFYS”) “has made
reasonable efforts to support the family and foster the safe return
of the child to the family home.”891  The court found that because
DFYS was attempting to reunite the child with her biological fa-
ther at the time of the proceedings, it was not clear that the
mother’s parental rights were terminated for purposes of adoption
or permanent placement.892  In addition, the court found that if ef-
forts to reunite the child with her father were successful, terminat-
ing the mother’s parental rights may not be in the child’s best in-
terests.893
In A.H. v. Department of Health and Social Services,894 the su-
preme court affirmed the termination of A.H.’s parental rights.895
The superior court did not err in finding that A.H.’s children were
Children In Need of Aid (“CINA”) “due to neglect, domestic vio-
lence, and mental illness,” any one of which would be sufficient on
its own to render them CINA.896  The record also supported the su-
perior court’s determination that A.H. had not corrected the condi-
tions that put his children at risk.897  Further, the court did not err in
finding that the state made active, reasonable efforts to promote
the children’s safe return to their parents.898  As required by the In-
dian Child Welfare Act, the state also proved likely “serious emo-
tional and physical damage” would result from continued custody
by A.H.899
In Allen v. Child Support Enforcement Division,900 the supreme
court held that the superior court erred in dismissing Allen’s ap-
peal of the Child Support Enforcement Division’s (“CSED”) deci-
sion not to modify his child support order as untimely.901  Allen pe-
titioned CSED to seek a court order reducing his child support
obligations and also requested review of a CSED decision regard-
ing his unpaid child support.902  After CSED denied review of both
of his claims, he appealed to the superior court, which dismissed his
891. Id.
892. See id. at 954.
893. See id. at 954-55.
894. 10 P.3d 1156 (Alaska 2000).
895. See id. at 1158.
896. Id. at 1161.
897. See id. at 1163.
898. See id. at 1165.
899. Id.
900. 15 P.3d 743 (Alaska 2000).
901. See id. at 745.
902. See id.
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appeal as untimely.903  However, because CSED did not notify Al-
len that its decisions were final, the thirty-day appeal period did
not begin to run, and therefore, the court held that Allen’s appeals
were not untimely.904  As a result, the court reversed and remanded
the dismissal of Allen’s appeal.905  Because another court was con-
sidering Allen’s appeal of the CSED decision regarding his unpaid
child support, the court held that dismissal of that appeal as un-
timely was harmless error.906
In D.M. v. Division of Family and Youth Services,907 the su-
preme court held that Children In Need of Aid (“CINA”) rules
governing adjudication and termination processes did not preclude
the State from using the clear and convincing standard of evidence
at an adjudication hearing.908  CINA rules required different stan-
dards of proof for adjudication and termination stages, with the
termination stage requiring the clear and convincing standard, as
opposed to the usual preponderance of the evidence standard used
for the adjudication stage.909  The State filed a petition to adjudicate
D.M.’s children as CINA, and once a hearing was held on the peti-
tion, the State asked that the clear and convincing standard be used
in the adjudication proceeding.910  The State had not given notice to
D.M. that it sought to use the stricter evidentiary standard.911 After
a finding that the children were CINA, the State sought to termi-
nate D.M.’s parental rights for four of her five children.912  In ter-
minating those rights, the superior court relied on the clear and
convincing standard findings of the adjudication proceeding.913  The
supreme court affirmed this finding and noted that D.M. was not
foreclosed from litigating issues relevant to the termination of her
rights at the termination proceeding.914
In In re Dissolution of the Marriage of Alaback,915 the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s denial of a motion to unseal re-
cords regarding a child custody proceeding where the movant had
not shown that her interest in disclosure outweighed the potential
903. See id. at 745-46.
904. See id. at 748.
905. See id. at 749.
906. See id. at 748-49.
907. 995 P.2d 205 (Alaska 2000).
908. See id. at 209.
909. See id. at 208.
910. See id. at 207.
911. See id.
912. See id. at 207-08.
913. See id. at 207.
914. See id. at 209.
915. 997 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 2000).
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harm to the child.916  The dispute giving rise to the motion centered
on a tape made by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) of a session with a
child who was the subject of a custody proceeding.917  The GAL had
turned the tape over to the opposing attorney after the attorney
stipulated that she would not reveal its contents to her client, the
child’s mother.918  When the attorney violated this stipulation, the
superior court ordered the contents of the tape sealed.919  Four
years later, the attorney sought to unseal the material for use in
other cases involving the GAL, but the superior court denied her
motion because it could not determine the potential significance of
the records outside the context of the proposed litigation and the
attorney had not demonstrated that unsealing the files would have
no adverse impact on the child.920  The supreme court held that, be-
cause the attorney’s motion did not challenge the original order,
the superior court acted within its discretion in denying the mo-
tion.921
In Jenkins v. Handel,922 the supreme court affirmed the supe-
rior court’s denial of Jenkins’s motion to modify a custody agree-
ment, finding that the superior court had adequately weighed fac-
tors relevant to the best interests of the children.923  Jenkins argued
that her improved living conditions, the children’s desire to live
with her, and Handel’s failure to comply with visitation agreements
all supported her claim to modify custody.924  Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 25.20.110(a) requires a court to consider the best interests of a
child and requires that the non-custodial parent establish a change
in circumstances.925  In considering the best interests of the children,
the superior court found that Handel had shown “mature parental
judgment” in his monitoring of the children and that this judgment
outweighed the children’s desire to live with Jenkins.926  Because
the supreme court agreed that the children’s preferences were not
“mature and well reasoned” and that the children needed a highly
monitored environment, it upheld the superior court’s ruling.927
916. See id. at 1186.
917. See id. at 1182.
918. See id. at 1183.
919. See id. at 1183-84.
920. See id. at 1184, 1186.
921. See id. at 1186.
922. 10 P.3d 586 (Alaska 2000).
923. See id. at 588.
924. See id. at 589.
925. See id.
926. Id. at 590.
927. Id. at 590-91.
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Additionally, the supreme court found that the superior court had
given adequate consideration to Jenkins’ changed circumstances
and that the superior court was not in error when it failed to con-
sider Handel’s failure to comply with visitation agreements.928
In Lauth v. Alaska Department of Health and Social Services,929
the supreme court upheld the superior court’s denial of Lauth’s
claim for welfare benefits based on its interpretation of “physical
custody.”930  The Alaska Temporary Assistance Program provides
welfare to the families of needy children when one parent or both
parents apply.931  To qualify for the benefits, a parent must establish
“physical custody of one or more . . . dependent children.”932  Lauth
applied for benefits under this program, claiming that she had
physical custody of her children even though she shared custody
with John Hasty.933  The Temporary Assistance Agency applied
Alaska Administrative Code title 7, section 45.225(b) and denied
her claim because she actually had custody of the children for
fewer hours during each month than Hasty.934  Lauth then appealed
to the director of the agency, claiming that the agency should have
applied Alaska Administrative Code title 7, section 45.225(d) to
determine physical custody by weighing a number of different fac-
tors instead of simply adding up the hours.935  The director denied
Lauth’s appeal, claiming that the factor test only applied when both
parents claimed benefits and the hourly count applied when one
parent claimed benefits.936  The superior court upheld this denial,
finding that the distinction made by the agency between the two
ways of determining physical custody was a reasonable distinction
consistent with the statute’s purpose.937  Further, the distinction
posed no equal protection problems because “children with one
economically secure parent who is providing for their care at least
fifty percent of the time are not similarly situated with children
having both parents economically eligible for benefits.”938
928. See id. at 591-92.
929. 12 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2000).
930. Id. at 182.
931. See id.
932. Id.
933. See id. at 183.
934. See id.
935. See id.
936. See id.
937. See id. at 185.
938. Id. at 187.
YIR_FMT.DOC 04/24/01  12:03 PM
148 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [18:1
In L.G. v. Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services,939
the supreme court held that the trial court did not err in terminat-
ing a native’s parental rights following a long history of abandon-
ment and substance abuse, or in deviating from the Indian Child
Welfare Act’s preferences by placing one of the children with a
non-native foster parent.940  Linda had a long history of substance
abuse, imprisonment, and parole violations.941  Throughout Linda’s
troubles, two of her children, J.G. and S.G., had been placed in and
out of the custody of numerous adults.942  Following a court order
terminating Linda’s parental rights and placing her children in fos-
ter homes, Linda appealed.943  By statute, termination of parental
rights of an Indian child requires a determination “‘that continued
custody of the child by the parent . . . is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.’”944  The supreme court
clarified that this determination requires “both proof that the par-
ent’s conduct is likely to harm the children, and proof that it is un-
likely that the parent will change her conduct.”945  Because quali-
fied experts testified that Linda’s repeated drug abuses and
repeated separations from her children caused her children serious
mental injury, the court found that “both girls were at a substantial
risk of suffering further mental injury if returned to her care,” and
that Linda’s parental misconduct was likely to continue.946  Fur-
thermore, the court reasoned that where there is “clear evidence
that a child faces a serious risk of physical neglect if she remains in
her parent’s care, a trial judge may terminate parental rights with-
out hearing testimony from an expert in Native cultures.”947  Ac-
cordingly, given the record in this case, the supreme court found
that the termination of Linda’s parental rights did not require tes-
timony from an expert in Native culture.948
In Pearson v. Pearson,949 the supreme court held that the supe-
rior court did not abuse its discretion in denying a father’s request
for a child custody investigation or in finding continued custody by
939. 14 P.3d 946 (Alaska 2000).
940. See id. at 955-56.
941. See id. at 947-49.
942. See id.
943. See id. at 949.
944. Id. at 950 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §1912(f) (1994)).
945. Id. at 950.
946. Id. at 951.
947. Id. at 952-53.
948. See id. at 954.
949. 5 P.3d 239 (Alaska 2000).
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the mother to be in the children’s best interests.950  Sara Pearson
was awarded custody of the children after a divorce from her hus-
band, Mark.951  After Sara moved to Pennsylvania, Mark sought
changes to the custody arrangement.952  While the trial court did not
change the custody arrangement, it did alter the visitation sched-
ule.953  First, the supreme court noted that it is within the trial court
judge’s discretion to decide whether a child custody investigator
should be appointed and that Mark “failed to explain how that dis-
cretion was abused.”954  Second, the supreme court affirmed the
trial court’s findings that continuing custody with the mother was in
the children’s best interest because Sara was not trying to alienate
Mark and the children had an interest in a stable environment.955
Finally, the court found that Mark’s claim of gender bias did not
warrant reversal of the trial court.956
In P.G. v. Division of Family and Youth Services,957 the su-
preme court held that the Division of Family and Youth Services
(“DFYS”) breached its duty to a foster family by failing to disclose
their foster child’s past disciplinary and psychological problems.958
The court overturned a summary judgment ruling in favor of the
DFYS, because there was a genuine factual dispute on the issue of
whether the child’s physical and sexual assaults on his foster sister
and brother were foreseeable consequences of the DFYS’s failure
to disclose the child’s past history.959  In response to the State’s ar-
gument that nondisclosure was immaterial because the assaults on
the family’s children were not foreseeable, the court stressed that
foreseeability requires only that the injuries are “of the general na-
ture that could be expected.”960  Finally, the court held that the
plaintiff’s claim against the DFYS did not “arise from an invasion
of financial or commercial interests,” and, therefore, did not qual-
ify as a “misrepresentation” claim against the State barred by
Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250(3).961  Accordingly, the court re-
950. See id. at 242.
951. See id. at 240.
952. See id.
953. See id. at 242.
954. Id.
955. See id. at 243.
956. See id. at 244.
957. 4 P.3d 326 (Alaska 2000).
958. See id. at 328.
959. See id. at 335.
960. Id. (emphasis added).
961. Id. at 336.
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versed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment based on
this provision.962
In R.I. v. C.C.,963 the supreme court held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mother sole custody
and denying the father’s request for a paternity test.964  Constance
and Richard had custody of their daughter, Cindy, at varying
times.965  On August 5, 1996, Constance applied for sole custody of
Cindy and asked for permission to apply for Cindy’s permanent
fund dividend.966  In determining that Constance should be awarded
sole custody, the superior court made findings of fact in addition to
considering the guardian ad litem’s recommendation that Con-
stance be awarded custody.967  The supreme court’s review of the
findings of fact found that none were clearly erroneous and that the
superior court’s ruling was not “prejudicial” to Richard.968  Fur-
thermore, the superior court was correct in denying Richard’s re-
quest for a paternity test because neither Richard nor Constance
had contested the paternity.969
In R.M. v. S.G.,970 the supreme court upheld the trial court’s
modification of child custody because the trial court’s factual find-
ings were not clearly erroneous and its legal conclusions were
properly reached.971  Scott Greenville sought full custody of his
children following allegations of physical abuse by Rose Marlowe’s
new husband, Michael.972  Based on evidence provided by testi-
mony of the children and the custody investigator, Dr. Glass, the
trial court found that a substantial change in circumstances war-
ranted the change in custody to Scott with supervised visitation by
Rose.973  The supreme court found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to compel Dr. Glass to disclose Scott’s
psychological report.974  The court found that Rose failed to seek
reasonable relief and that conflicting expert interpretations of the
raw psychological data would not have been likely to alter the out-
962. See id.
963. 9 P.3d 274 (Alaska 2000).
964. See id. at 277-79.
965. See id. at 275.
966. See id. at 276.
967. See id. at 277-78.
968. See id. at 278.
969. See id. at 279.
970. 13 P.3d 747 (Alaska 2000).
971. See id. at 747.
972. See id. at 749.
973. See id. at 750.
974. See id. at 751.
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come.975  The court also found no error in requiring Rose to pay
$1200 to depose Dr. Glass, because Rose did not argue or demon-
strate that the $1200 fee constituted “manifest injustice” under
Alaska Civil Rule 26(b)(4)(C).976  Furthermore, the supreme court
found that since Rose did not properly raise her objections to the
admission of hearsay from Dr. Glass’ report at trial, she had waived
them on appeal.977  Finally, Rose’s objections to the modification of
custody were denied because there was no clear error in the trial
court’s determination that circumstances had changed and that the
modification was in the best interest of the children.978
In S.S.M. v. Division of Family and Youth Services,979 the su-
preme court vacated the trial court’s order dismissing S.S.M.’s mo-
tion to gain custody of her brother pursuant to Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 47.14.100(e) and remanded to the trial court.980  S.S.M. is the
natural sister of J.M., a child placed in the State’s custody “for
adoptive purposes” in 1996 and who was living with a foster family
as of June 1999.981  In July 1999, S.S.M. filed a pro se Motion to
Place Child with Relative.982  Alaska Statutes section 47.14.100(e)
provides that, except under certain exceptional circumstances, a
child in need of aid should be placed in the home of a relative at
that relative’s request.983  However, Alaska Statutes section
47.14.100(f) renders this preference for placement with a relative
inapplicable to “child placement for adoptive purposes.”984  The
court held that the statutory meaning of “for adoptive purposes”
requires “a specific nexus between the existing placement and the
ultimate purpose of adoption,” not merely the hope of eventually
finding adoptive parents.985  Thus, S.S.M. is not disqualified from
seeking preferential placement.986
In Valentino v. Cote,987 the supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s grant of a father’s motion to transfer legal and physical cus-
tody of his fourteen-year-old son from his former wife to him.988
975. See id.
976. See id. at 752.
977. See id.
978. See id. at 752-53.
979. 3 P.3d 342 (Alaska 2000).
980. See id. at 348.
981. Id. at 344.
982. See id.
983. See id. at 345-46.
984. Id. at 346.
985. Id. at 347.
986. See id. at 347-48.
987. 3 P.3d 337 (Alaska 2000).
988. See id. at 338.
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After the child’s relationship with his mother deteriorated, the
child moved into his father’s home and refused to live with his
mother.989  Custody modification is valid if the father shows that a
significant change in the child’s circumstances has occurred and
that a modification would be in the child’s best interests.990  The
court held that the present circumstances qualified as significant
changes.991  The court also held that the child’s preferences had
been properly considered because the child was of sufficient age
and capacity to form a preference.992
C. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Marital Property
In Coffland v. Coffland,993 the supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s sanction of appellant, Ken Coffland, under Alaska Civil
Rule 37 for failure to comply with court-ordered discovery, but re-
manded for reevaluation of the allocation of the marital property.994
Because Mr. Coffland had refused repeated requests, including a
court order, to produce documents related to the business he and
his wife, Susan Coffland, had owned, Mr. Coffland was permitted
to present at trial only his own testimony and documentation that
had previously been disclosed to Mrs. Coffland.995  The court im-
posed this sanction to “[strike] an appropriate balance between
sanctioning recalcitrant discovery behavior and allowing [Mr. Cof-
fland] the opportunity to present his case.”996  The trial court re-
fused to allow Mr. Coffland to testify about two promissory notes
signed by Mrs. Coffland, because they did not substantiate his tes-
timony;  as a result, these debts were characterized as non-
marital.997  The supreme court affirmed the sanctions but held that
it was error to conclude that these debts did not exist as marital
property, when Mrs. Coffland admitted their existence and signed
the notes herself. 998
In Edelman v. Edelman,999 the supreme court reversed in part
the superior court’s division of the marital property debts between
plaintiff, Tammi Edelman, and her former husband, Duane Edel-
989. See id.
990. See id. at 340.
991. See id.
992. See id.
993. 4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000).
994. See id. at 322.
995. See id. at 319-320.
996. Id. at 321.
997. See id. at 319-20.
998. See id. at 321-22.
999. 3 P.3d 348 (Alaska 2000).
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man, and upheld the decision to vacate all alimony arrearages that
Duane owed her.1000  The court upheld the superior court’s deter-
mination that a fishing permit was a premarital asset of Duane not
subject to distribution because Tammi did not take an active inter-
est in its ongoing maintenance, management, and control.1001  The
supreme court then held that the award of the marital residence to
Tammi was erroneous because it was based on the mistaken as-
sumption that the property had been subdivided, and because the
appraisal could not be challenged after both parties had previously
agreed on a property value.1002  The court remanded the issue of
whether Tammi’s claimed post-separation mortgage payments
from non-marital income should be credited against the residence’s
value.1003  The court held that any compensatory damages eventu-
ally awarded to Duane for lost income arising out of the Exxon
Valdez disaster would be marital property, while any damages
awarded for devaluation of the fishing permit would remain
Duane’s separate property.1004  Finally, the court found that the su-
perior court’s allocation of Duane’s entire pension fund to him was
erroneous as a matter of law because retirement benefits earned
during the marriage are marital assets subject to equitable divi-
sion.1005  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision
to vacate alimony arrearages that Duane owed, because Tammi
had remarried and had sufficient time to recover her financial sta-
bility.1006
In Glasen v. Glasen,1007 the supreme court held that the supe-
rior court did not err when it denied the incorporation of a separa-
tion agreement into a later divorce, because the separation agree-
ment was not a final order and because it terminated upon a
subsequent reconciliation.1008  Danny and Gail Glasen married in
1987.1009  In July 1991, the Glasens were separated legally, but they
remained married and reconciled a few months later.1010  Upon fil-
ing for divorce in 1997, Danny sought to enforce the 1991 separa-
1000. See id. at 350.
1001. See id. at 351-52.
1002. See id. at 353.
1003. See id. at 354.
1004. See id. at 354-55.
1005. See id. at 355-56.
1006. See id. at 358.
1007. 13 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2000).
1008. See id. at 722-23.
1009. See id. at 720-21.
1010. See id. at 721.
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tion agreement.1011  The supreme court held that the Glasen’s de-
cree of separation was not a final order for two primary reasons.1012
First, the court found that the decree was meant to be “provisional
and conditional,” because Danny’s testimony indicated that the
separation was not a permanent arrangement.1013  Second, the
agreement could not embody a final property distribution because
it did not list or describe all the spouses’ assets, and because the
Glasens continued their marriage relationship for six years after
the initial settlement agreement.1014  The supreme court further held
that a legal separation decree terminates “if the parties become
reconciled and resume cohabitation.”1015  Since the “Glasens’ rec-
onciliation, cohabitation, and economic commingling [after the
separation] indicated an intent to behave as a marital unit,” their
separation agreement was effectively rescinded and was properly
withheld from the divorce decree.1016
In McDougall v. Lumpkin,1017 the supreme court vacated and
remanded the property division and alimony award in the parties’
divorce decree, but affirmed the award of joint legal custody.1018
The divorce decree divided the couple’s marital net worth, giving
Lumpkin assets worth approximately $35,600 and McDougall a net
value of negative $14,200, including responsibility for the student
loans she incurred during the marriage.1019  In addition, the oral
findings of the divorce proceeding provided for alimony for
McDougall of $500 a month for four years, given the division of the
property.1020  However, the written findings did not specify the du-
ration of the alimony and the court subsequently issued an adden-
dum stating that the alimony would be payable for two years.1021
Lastly, the divorce decree gave the parties joint custody of their
four children.1022  Because the division of property was “grossly in-
equitable,” and it appeared that the alimony award had not been
treated independently, the court vacated and remanded for an eq-
uitable division.1023  In addition, the court held that the lower court
1011. See id. at 722.
1012. See id. at 722-23.
1013. See id.
1014. See id. at 723.
1015. Id. (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation § 409 (1998)).
1016. Id. at 724.
1017. 11 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000).
1018. See id. at 991-92.
1019. See id. at 993-94.
1020. See id. at 995.
1021. See id.
1022. See id. at 995-96.
1023. See id. at 993.
YIR_FMT.DOC 04/24/01  12:03 PM
2001] THE YEAR IN REVIEW 155
abused its discretion when it treated McDougall’s student loans as
non-marital debt and allocated the entire amount to her.1024  On
remand, the court ordered the loans be treated as marital debt and
ordered that the duration of the alimony payment be clarified.1025
Finally, because the record did not show that the court abused its
discretion in granting the parties’ joint custody, the court affirmed
the award.1026
In Sampson v. Sampson,1027 the supreme court held that the
trial court abused its discretion by including inheritance in marital
property subject to a divorce.1028  After inheriting securities from his
deceased mother in 1990, William Sampson placed the securities in
an account bearing only his name.1029  In 1994, Susan Sampson
cashed in her retirement account from her employment as a police
officer partly because “she knew that William’s inheritance would
be available for their future needs.”1030  The supreme court found it
was error to include the inheritance as marital property in the di-
vorce proceedings, because William’s promise that the inheritance
would be available to him and Susan during the marriage was “not
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that inheritance is
separate property.”1031  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
inheritance was not marital property, because Susan alone made
the decision to cash in the retirement fund, not in reliance on any
promises by William.1032  Finally, the court remanded the case to de-
termine whether and to what extent invasion of William’s separate
property was required.1033
IX.  INSURANCE LAW
In Moore v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1034 the supreme court held
that federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over fraud
and misrepresentation claims against write-your-own (“WYO”) in-
surers under the National Flood Insurance Program.1035  Moore ac-
quired flood insurance from an Allstate agent under the WYO
1024. See id. at 994.
1025. See id.
1026. See id. at 996-97.
1027. 14 P.3d 272 (Alaska 2000).
1028. See id. at 277.
1029. See id. at 274.
1030. Id. at 275.
1031. Id. at 276.
1032. See id. at 277.
1033. See id.
1034. 995 P.2d 231 (Alaska 2000).
1035. See id. at 239.
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program, in which private insurance companies sell Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (“FEMA”) flood insurance policies.1036
When her house was condemned, FEMA awarded her forty per-
cent of the house’s fair market value.1037  Disappointed with the
payment, Moore filed suit in state court against Allstate and its
agent, making various claims, including fraud and misrepresenta-
tion.1038  Because the superior court held that federal courts had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over such claims, Moore’s claims were dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1039  The supreme court
reversed, holding that while federal courts do have exclusive juris-
diction over direct claims under the policy, they do not have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over claims of fraud and misrepresentation.1040
In Bennett v. Hedglin,1041 the supreme court held that the lower
court properly granted summary judgment to an insurer that de-
nied coverage for the loss of a cabin destroyed in a fire.1042  The in-
surer denied coverage on the grounds that the appellant policy-
holder made numerous misrepresentations on his application,
including a false statement that the cabin was his primary resi-
dence.1043  The court concluded that this misrepresentation was ma-
terial to the insurer’s acceptance of the risk of insuring the cabin,
and that consequently, Alaska Statutes section 21.42.110 permitted
the insurer to deny coverage.1044  The court further concluded that it
was not necessary for the insurer to have cancelled the policy prior
to the fire, because the policyholder’s misrepresentation rendered
the insurance policy void ab initio.1045  Although the court deter-
mined that the appellant improperly had been denied an oral ar-
gument, it held that the denial was harmless error because the ap-
pellant failed to demonstrate that it prejudiced him.1046
In C.P. v. All-State Insurance Co.,1047 the supreme court held
that salaried insurance adjusters owe a tort duty of reasonable care
to the insured, and that the policy in question covered claims in-
volving the insured’s alleged negligent failure to protect a visiting
1036. See id. at 232, 234.
1037. See id. at 233.
1038. See id.
1039. See id.
1040. See id. at 238-39.
1041. 995 P.2d 668 (Alaska 2000).
1042. See id. at 674.
1043. See id. at 671.
1044. See id. at 672.
1045. See id. at 674.
1046. See id.
1047. 996 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 2000).
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child.1048  The plaintiff was a child who was assaulted while visiting
the home of the insured, the Lancasters, by their adult son.1049  The
Lancasters reached a settlement with the plaintiff and her family
and assigned to them their rights against All-State Insurance.1050
The supreme court held that a salaried adjuster employed by the
insurer owes a duty of care to the insured in addition to any con-
tractual duty.1051  The court “construe[d] grants of coverage broadly
and interpret[ed] exclusions narrowly,”1052 finding that the insur-
ance policy covered the claim that the homeowners were negligent
in failing to protect the visiting child.1053
In Kim v. National Indemnity Co.,1054 the supreme court held
that Kim’s automobile insurance did not cover the injuries caused
by Kim’s sexual abuse of a minor in his taxicab.1055  Kim was con-
victed of second- and third-degree sexual abuse of a minor and as-
signed his indemnity rights against his insurance company to the
mother of the minor child in the corresponding civil suit.1056  Kim’s
automobile insurance policy covered damages that were caused by
an accident.1057  However, because Kim was convicted of knowingly
engaging in sexual contact, the child’s injuries were not acciden-
tal.1058  Furthermore, the court inferred intent to cause injury as a
matter of law, and therefore, there was no coverage under the pol-
icy because the sexual abuse was not accidental.1059  In addition, the
court held that the abuse or molestation exclusion in the policy did
not provide coverage for injuries caused by Kim even if the minor
was not in the care, custody, or control of the insured.1060
In Lloyd’s & Institute of London Underwriting Cos. v. Ful-
ton,1061 the supreme court held that an insurer must inform an in-
sured of potential coverage issues, and that breach of this duty to
inform estops the insurer from denying coverage if the breach
caused actual harm to the insured.1062  Fulton was injured while
1048. See id.
1049. See id. at 1218.
1050. See id.
1051. See id. at 1221-22.
1052. Id. at 1223.
1053. See id. at 1229.
1054. 6 P.3d 264 (Alaska 2000).
1055. See id. at 266.
1056. See id.
1057. See id. at 267.
1058. See id.
1059. See id.
1060. See id. at 269.
1061. 2 P.3d 1199 (Alaska 2000).
1062. See id. at 1206, 1210.
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working aboard a fishing vessel owned by Clark.1063  Clark was in-
sured under an indemnity policy provided by Pacific Marine Insur-
ance Company (“PacMar”) and Lloyd’s & Institute of London Un-
derwriting Companies (“Lloyd’s”).1064  The vessel’s coverage under
the policy was limited to specific geographical areas.1065  Upon noti-
fication of Fulton’s injury, PacMar immediately recognized poten-
tial problems with coverage and began to investigate the claim.1066
As a result, an investigator questioned Clark and his son without
their attorney present and obtained information that the vessel had
been outside the policy’s geographical limits when Fulton was in-
jured.1067  After the investigation, PacMar notified Clark of its in-
tent to reserve the right to dispute coverage.1068  Clark settled with
Fulton and assigned Fulton his right to proceed against the insur-
ers.1069  In the meantime, PacMar became insolvent and the court
held that PacMar’s actions bound Lloyd’s, noting that there should
be only one defense because there was only one policy.1070
The court held that PacMar had enough information about its
potential coverage defenses to give Clark notice and that it
breached its duty of loyalty by failing to give notice before investi-
gating the coverage problem.1071  The court further held that, by in-
terviewing the Clarks without their counsel or informing them of
their rights, PacMar prejudiced the Clarks.  As such, PacMar was
estopped from denying coverage even though the claim would have
been denied because the injury occurred outside the policy’s geo-
graphical limits.1072
In Makarka v. Great American Insurance Co.,1073 the supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Great American Insurance Company (“Great Ameri-
can”).1074  Members of the Makarka family were killed when their
car was hit by a truck driven by Voliva.1075  The Makarkas learned
that the breaks on Voliva’s truck were improperly serviced by
1063. See id. at 1201.
1064. See id.
1065. See id.
1066. See id.
1067. See id.
1068. See id.
1069. See id.
1070. See id.
1071. See id. at 1206.
1072. See id. at 1209.
1073. 14 P.3d 964 (Alaska 2000).
1074. See id. at 970.
1075. See id. at 965.
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Calihan prior to the accident.1076  Calihan’s employer was insured by
Great American when the brakes were worked on and by Inter-
state Fire and Casualty when the accident occurred.1077  The court
held that the insurance policy provided by Great American was an
“occurrence policy” that only covered bodily injury that occurred
during the dates of coverage.1078  Because the accident and resulting
bodily injury occurred outside Great American’s coverage, Great
American did not have a duty to indemnify.1079  The court also re-
jected the Makarkas’ claim that Calihan caused property damage
by improperly servicing Voliva’s breaks during the dates of cover-
age because the damage was done to the breaks, not to the Ma-
karkas.1080  Consequently, the court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of Great American.1081
In M.C. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York,1082 the su-
preme court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant,
Northern Insurance, against the claims of a fifteen-year-old girl and
her mother.1083  The appellant was employed by the Anchorage
Daily News to deliver papers.  During the course of her employ-
ment, she engaged in sexual relations with her supervisor, Steven
Flory, a thirty-four-year-old man.1084  The appellant sued the An-
chorage Daily News’s insurer, Northern Insurance, since the rela-
tions in question occurred while Flory was employed there.1085  The
court held that Steven Flory was not covered by the insurance be-
cause the policy explicitly excludes “bodily injury to a co-
employee.”1086
In Nichols v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,1087 the supreme
court affirmed summary judgment to an insurer sued on theories of
negligent and intentional spoliation of evidence, which the court
refused to recognize under Alaska law.1088  The suit stemmed from
an incident in which Nichols was injured when a ladder collapsed
beneath him while he was repairing a neighbor’s roof; Nichols filed
a claim with the neighbor’s insurer, State Farm, for payment of
1076. See id.
1077. See id.
1078. See id. at 967.
1079. See id.
1080. See id. at 967-68.
1081. See id. at 970.
1082. 1 P.3d 673 (Alaska 2000).
1083. See id.
1084. See id. at 674.
1085. See id.
1086. Id. at 675.
1087. 6 P.3d 300 (Alaska 2000).
1088. See id. at 304-05.
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medical expenses.1089  State Farm investigated the claim but could
not locate the ladder, allegedly because it was destroyed in a fire at
the neighbor’s home that occurred before Nichols filed his claim.1090
When State Farm determined that the neighbor was not negligent
and refused to pay Nichols’s medical expenses, Nichols sued the
neighbor and State Farm, alleging that State Farm had negligently,
recklessly, or intentionally failed to locate critical evidence.1091  The
supreme court held that there was no evidence that State Farm
acted recklessly or intentionally, and that because Alaska has not
recognized an independent tort for negligent spoliation of evi-
dence, Nichols’s suit against State Farm could not be maintained.1092
In Powers v. United Services Automobile Ass’n,1093 the supreme
court held that an injured plaintiff who successfully arbitrated an
uninsured motorist claim against a primary insurance carrier can-
not preclude a secondary carrier from further arbitration where the
secondary carrier had neither adequate notice of the first arbitra-
tion nor an opportunity to participate in it.1094  The plaintiff, Karl
Roth Powers, was injured in an automobile collision involving an
uninsured driver.1095  State Farm Insurance had the primary obliga-
tion to pay any damages resulting from Powers’ injury, up to the
limit of its policy coverage; United Services Automobile Associa-
tion (“USAA”) was obligated to pay damages that exceeded those
covered by State Farm.1096  Powers and his wife demanded arbitra-
tion with State Farm on the issue of damages.1097  After the State
Farm arbitration, the Powers demanded that USAA pay compen-
sation for the excess damages, but USAA disputed the amount of
damages claimed by the Powers and demanded separate arbitra-
tion.1098  The court held USAA was not collaterally estopped from
demanding arbitration of the Powers’ claim because USAA did not
participate in State Farm’s arbitration and had no contractual rela-
tionship with State Farm.1099  The court also held that, because the
Powers did not demand that USAA participate or make any effort
1089. See id. at 301.
1090. See id. at 302.
1091. See id.
1092. See id. at 304-05.
1093. 6 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2000).
1094. See id. at 295.
1095. See id.
1096. See id. at 296.
1097. See id.
1098. See id. at 296-97.
1099. See id. at 298.
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to consolidate the arbitrations, USAA did not waive its right to ar-
bitration.1100
In West v. Umialik Insurance Co.,1101 the supreme court applied
the doctrine of reasonable expectations to reverse the lower court’s
ruling in favor of an insurer and to remand for entry of summary
judgment for homeowners whose house had settled when soil un-
der the foundation was eroded by water from broken plumbing.1102
The insurer justified its original denial of coverage to the home-
owners by citing exclusions in their policy for damage caused by
“settling, shrinking, bulging or expansion,” “earth movement,” and
water damage from “water below the surface of the ground.”1103
The court held that a reasonable person could understand “set-
tling” and “water damage” as referring to exclusively natural or ex-
ternal phenomena.1104  The “settling” clause was part of a list of ex-
clusions entailing natural or environmental concerns, justifying the
homeowners’ belief that settling in their policy referred only to that
caused naturally.1105  A provision that the insurer would pay for
“water damage not otherwise excluded” connoted coverage of
some water damage.1106  The earth movement exclusion was not
limited to natural events but did not contemplate exclusion for
damage from improvements to the house made by the insured.1107
The court finally noted that case law interpreting similar provisions
generally covered damage of the sort occurring here.1108
X.  PROPERTY LAW
In Alaska v. United States,1109 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided that title to an Alaskan riverbed, which lies
within a tract of land withdrawn from sale in 1943 and made a fed-
eral reserve, did not pass from the federal government to the state
upon Alaska’s statehood in 1959 or upon a change in the status of
the withdrawn land after statehood.1110  When the U.S. conveyed
parts of the riverbed to Alaska Native corporations, the State of
Alaska challenged the conveyances in federal district court, claim-
1100. See id.
1101. 8 P.3d 1135 (Alaska 2000).
1102. See id. at 1138.
1103. See id. at 1137.
1104. See id. at 1140-43.
1105. See id. at 1139.
1106. See id. at 1142.
1107. See id.
1108. See id. at 1139.
1109. 213 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
1110. See id. at 1098.
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ing that, because the river was navigable, the State acquired title
upon statehood.1111  The circuit court certified two questions: (1)
whether Congress intended to defeat the passage of title to sub-
merged lands, including the riverbed, to the state on the date of
statehood; and (2) assuming that Congress did intend to defeat the
passage of title, whether the submerged lands passed to the state
when the withdrawal order was revoked after statehood.1112  The
circuit court held that the Alaska Statehood Act acknowledged the
authority of the federal government to exercise the power of exclu-
sive legislation over tracts of land held before statehood by the U.S
for military purposes, and that the U.S. acquires title upon the ex-
ercise of that power.1113  The court noted that the exclusive legisla-
tion power applied even if only small parts of the withdrawn tract
were being used for military purposes.1114  The court also held that,
pursuant to the Statehood Act, the U.S. lost exclusive legislative
jurisdiction when the withdrawal order was revoked but that this
loss did not also cause loss of title.1115  The court therefore held that
the U.S. retained title to the riverbed and remanded the case to the
district court for further proceedings.1116
In Fairbanks North Star Borough Assessor’s Office v. Golden
Heart Utilities,1117 the supreme court held that the reversionary
method, used to value Golden Heart’s possessory interest of the
Fairbanks downtown utilidor system, was a “recognized and ap-
propriate method of valuation.”1118  The reversionary method “es-
timates the value of a leasehold interest by taking the value of the
fee interest of the property and deducting both the value of the
burden of use restrictions imposed by the City and the value of the
City’s reversionary interest in the property.”1119  The court held the
reversionary method to be an appropriate valuation of a possessory
interest for tax-exempt property, such as the utilidor system.1120
The court did find, however, that the assessor erred in making a
deduction for use restrictions, because when the property reverts to
1111. See id. at 1093.
1112. See id. at 1098.
1113. See id. at 1094-95.
1114. See id.
1115. See id. at 1097.
1116. See id. at 1098.
1117. 13 P.3d 263 (Alaska 2000).
1118. Id. at 265.
1119. Id. at 265-66.
1120. See id. at 272.
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the City, it will not contain these restrictions.1121  The court found
no equal protection or due process violations.1122
In Kottke v. Parker,1123 the supreme court upheld the admission
of Kottke’s will to formal probate despite claims of undue influ-
ence and insane delusions in the writing of the will.1124  The supreme
court found that Parker’s presence during the revision of a will did
not create undue influence and that Kottke’s false belief that his
first wife’s children had stolen from him was not an insane delu-
sion.1125  The will, which Kottke had revised after his first wife’s
death and after discovering he had prostate cancer, left the major-
ity of Kottke’s estate to Parker.1126  The children of Kottke’s first
wife claimed that, when Kottke rewrote his will, Parker had ex-
erted an undue influence on him and he had suffered insane delu-
sions that the children had stolen from him.1127  Because “the trial
court made an exemplary inquiry and specifically addressed each
factual contention raised,” the supreme court upheld the finding
that Parker did not exert undue influence.1128  The supreme court
recognized that the superior court considered a number of factors,
including the fact that Parker was not the sole beneficiary, Parker
did not participate substantially in the writing of the will, and Kot-
tke did not act hastily.1129  Additionally, the supreme court found
that, because Kottke had a factual basis for the belief that the chil-
dren had stolen from him, he did not suffer insane delusions; thus,
his will was not affected by these alleged delusions.1130  “The supe-
rior court properly found that the facts urged by [the children] did
not support theories of undue influence or insane delusions.”1131
In Laverty v. Alaska Railroad Corp.,1132 the supreme court up-
held the superior court’s decision that injunctive relief against the
Alaska Railroad Corporation (“ARRC”) under the Public Notice
Clause was barred by laches.1133  ARRC entered into a contract
with Flamingo Brothers for removal of gravel from ARRC land.1134
1121. See id. at 272.
1122. See id. at 274.
1123. 6 P.3d 243 (Alaska 2000).
1124. See id. at 244.
1125. See id. at 247.
1126. See id. at 244-45.
1127. See id. at 245.
1128. Id.
1129. See id. at 247-48.
1130. See id. at 246-47.
1131. Id. at 247.
1132. 13 P.3d 725 (Alaska 2000).
1133. See id. at 738.
1134. See id. at 728.
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The court found that ARRC’s land was state land, therefore, it was
subject to the Public Notice Clause before it was disposed of.1135
The court also found that when ARRC made a contract with Fla-
mingo Brothers, ARRC disposed of an interest in the land.1136  In
addition, despite the applicability of the Public Notice Clause,
ARRC did not provide adequate prior notice.1137  The court re-
versed the lower court’s finding on notice, necessitating a remand
for entry of a declaratory judgment in favor of Laverty, as well as
an award of attorneys’ fees for Laverty.1138
In Simon v. State,1139 the supreme court affirmed the superior
court decision that Public Land Order (“PLO”) 1613 allowed
Alaska to do subsurface work or lower the elevation of the Glenn
Highway.1140  The Simons filed suit against the State of Alaska and
Quality Asphalt Paving, arguing that the easement granted by PLO
1613 only allowed the State to make improvements on the existing
highway and did not allow the State to expand it or alter its
course.1141  Because PLO 1613 contained ambiguous language re-
garding the scope of the easement, reasonably necessary changes to
the land were allowed.1142  The supreme court held that the superior
court’s determination that the changes were reasonably necessary
was not clearly erroneous.1143
In Snook v. Bowers,1144 the supreme court affirmed both a su-
perior court decision that the Bowerses were the sole owners of
property and a denial of Snook’s motion for relief from a stipulated
judgment regarding ownership of the property.1145  Prior to 1984,
the property belonged to the Shaan-Seet Native Corporation (the
“Corporation”), but in 1984, the Corporation conveyed the prop-
erty to “the heirs and devisees of James Snook, who died October
23, 1973.”1146  These heirs then sold the property to the Bowerses
who, upon payment of earnest money, began developing the
land.1147  Later investigation by a title insurance company revealed
that James Snook had a brother, Russell, who had died before
1135. See id. at 731.
1136. See id.
1137. See id. at 738.
1138. See id.
1139. 996 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 2000).
1140. See id. at 1214-15.
1141. See id. at 1213.
1142. See id.
1143. See id.
1144. 12 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2000).
1145. See id.
1146. Id.
1147. See id. at 775.
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James.1148  The heirs of James Snook then blamed Shaan-Seet for
the confusion, and Shaan-Seet filed an interpleader naming all of
the potential heirs.1149  The matter ended in a stipulation, which
Snook sought unsuccessfully to amend.1150  At the same time, Snook
had also filed a complaint against the Bowerses to cancel their pur-
chase of the property, and the trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the Bowerses.1151
The supreme court found that the trial court properly denied
Snook’s motion to amend the stipulation finding that the motion
did not present an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief.1152
The supreme court also upheld the grant of summary judgment for
the Bowerses.1153  Additionally, the court found that the payment of
earnest money gave the Bowerses equitable title and that they
gained title to any remaining interests in the property through ad-
verse possession.1154  The property involved was not exempted from
adverse possession by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
because, as a subdivision, it was considered developed land.1155
In Winther v. Gainhart Samuelson,1156 the supreme court held
that fishing rights cannot be sold as part of a partnership under a
state law claim after federal courts had already determined that no
fishing rights accrued to the partnership, and that the statute of
frauds barred enforcement of any alleged contract for the fishing
rights, because the alleged contract was not in writing.1157  John
Winther, Douglas Eaton, and Bud Samuelson owned a vessel, the
F/V Prowler, as tenants-in-common according to an ownership
agreement.1158  After Samuelson sold his interest in the vessel to the
other two in 1989, new fishing regulations allocated quota shares
(“IFQ shares”) to those individuals who owned vessels in order to
regulate the amount of fish that were removed from the Alaska
sea.1159  Former partners of dissolved partnerships were eligible for
the IFQ shares.1160  A federal court upheld an administrative ruling
that the parties had owned the vessel as individuals not as a part-
1148. See id.
1149. See id.
1150. See id.
1151. See id.
1152. See id. at 776.
1153. See id. at 777.
1154. See id. at 779.
1155. See id. at 780.
1156. 10 P.3d 1167 (Alaska 2000).
1157. See id. at 1173.
1158. See id. at 1168.
1159. See id. at 1169.
1160. See id.
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nership and, therefore, Samuelson was entitled to one-third of the
IFQ shares.1161  The supreme court held that because the federal
court had already determined Samuelson’s IFQ shares belonged to
him as an individual, the shares never accrued to the partnership
interest that Samuelson sold and Winther’s claim to those shares
failed as a matter of law.1162  Furthermore, the court held that
Alaska Statutes section 45.01.206 barred any claim that Samuelson
sold his IFQ shares in an alleged separate transaction because the
shares were worth more than 5,000 dollars and the alleged transac-
tion was not evidenced in writing.1163
XI.  TORT LAW
In Anderson v. Tuboscope Vetco, Inc.,1164 the court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant, Tuboscope Vetco, against
the tort claims of a temporary employee.1165  Anderson was a tem-
porary employee provided by Olsten, a temporary employment
company.1166  Anderson was injured during his employment at Tu-
boscope while performing his job duties.1167  The court held that
Tuboscope was immune from tort liability under the Exclusive
Remedy Provision of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act.1168
The court held that temporary employees are “employees of the
employer for workers’ compensation purposes as a matter of
law.”1169  Tuboscope was a special employer for workers’ compensa-
tion purposes, because the three criteria were met: “(a) the em-
ployee has made a contract of hire, express or implied with the spe-
cial employer; (b) the work being done is essentially that of the
special employer; and (c) the special employer has the right to con-
trol the details of the work.”1170
In Grant v. Stoyer,1171 the supreme court held that, where negli-
gence and causation of physical injury resulting from a car accident
are conceded or proved and there is substantial evidence indicating
some pain and suffering, the jury must award damages.1172  On De-
1161. See id. at 1170.
1162. See id. at 1171.
1163. See id. at 1171-73.
1164. 9 P.3d 1013 (Alaska 2000).
1165. See id. at 1020.
1166. See id. at 1015.
1167. See id. at 1016.
1168. See id.
1169. Id.
1170. Id. at 1017.
1171. 10 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2000).
1172. See id. at 598.
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cember 19, 1994, Stoyer drove her car into Grant’s car at an inter-
section.1173  Grant complained of pain in her chest, shoulder, back,
and knee, both to the paramedics who arrived at the scene of the
accident and to the emergency room admitting nurse.1174  Grant
subsequently received additional medical treatment and physical
therapy and underwent two shoulder surgeries.1175  Stoyer conceded
that she had been negligent, and thus the case went to trial only on
the questions of causation and damages.1176  The jury found that
Stoyer’s negligence did not cause Grant’s damages, and therefore
determined Grant should not receive any damage award.1177  Be-
cause she immediately complained of injury and sustained ongoing
treatment, “the jury had no evidentiary basis for finding that the
accident had caused no compensable injury to Grant.”1178  The court
reversed the superior court judgment and remanded Grant’s dam-
ages claim for a new trial.1179
In Guerrero v. Alaska Housing Finance Corp.,1180 the supreme
court held that the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that the
Housing Finance Corporation negligently breached its duty to a
minor who was struck by a car, was legally sufficient to withstand a
Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion, because the complaint alleged some
potentially non-discretionary functions under circumstances re-
quiring defendants to exercise due care.1181  Five-year-old Alexan-
der Guerrero was struck by a car and severely injured as he at-
tempted to cross a dangerous intersection outside his family’s
apartment complex.1182  Overturning the lower court’s Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal, the supreme court found that Guerrero’s con-
duct in crossing the street where no crosswalk existed did not ab-
solve the defendant of the duty it owed him, but rather would
“bear on the jury’s determination of negligence, breach, causation,
and damages.”1183  Furthermore, since it is not clear from the com-
plaint that the landlord’s duty was “vastly narrower than the duty
alleged by Guerrero,” dismissing the complaint under Rule
1173. See id. at 595.
1174. See id.
1175. See id.
1176. See id. at 594.
1177. See id. at 596.
1178. Id. at 597.
1179. See id. at 600.
1180. 6 P.3d 250 (Alaska 2000).
1181. See id. at 252.
1182. See id.
1183. Id. at 255.
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12(b)(6) amounted to error.1184  Finally, it was not clear beyond
doubt that all the complaints against the defendant were barred by
the discretionary function immunity provision of Alaska Statutes
section 09.50.250(1).1185  Despite finding that the corporation was an
instrumentality of the State for purposes of claiming sovereign im-
munity,1186 the supreme court held that at least one of Guerrero’s
complaints could fall within the rubric of “operation acts,” thus
precluding Alaska Statutes section 09.50.250(1)’s discretionary
function immunity defense, and precluding a 12(b)(6) dismissal.1187
In Hutton v. Realty Executives, Inc.,1188 the supreme court held
that, as a matter of law, constructive knowledge does not necessar-
ily begin the running of the statute of limitations in claims of mis-
representation or breach of professional duty where the subject of
constructive knowledge is the same subject about which there is an
alleged professional duty to advise the plaintiff.1189  In 1992, the
Huttons purchased a nine-unit property from the State, which was
represented by Realty Executives, Inc. (“Realty”).1190  The Huttons
discovered in 1997 that the property violated zoning regulations,
and filed suit against Realty in 1999 for negligent misrepresentation
and breach of professional duty for failing to notify the Huttons of
the zoning regulations.1191  Because seven years had passed since the
sale of the property, the trial court granted Realty’s motion to dis-
miss on statute of limitations grounds.1192  Under the discovery rule
adopted by the supreme court, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have
discovered the facts creating his cause of action.1193  Realty argued
that the Huttons had constructive knowledge of the law and should
have known of the zoning violations on the date of the sale, trig-
gering the statue of limitations.1194  However, the supreme court
held that constructive knowledge cannot be used to preclude
causes of action arising out of a professional relationship where the
plaintiff relied on the professional to convey knowledge, and the
professional in turn claimed that the plaintiff had constructive
1184. Id. at 258.
1185. See id. at 258-64.
1186. See id. at 259.
1187. See id. at 264.
1188. 14 P.3d 977 (Alaska 2000).
1189. See id. at 981.
1190. See id. at 979.
1191. See id.
1192. See id.
1193. See id. at 980.
1194. See id. at 979.
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knowledge.1195  As a result, the question of when the Huttons
should have known of the zoning problem and when the statute of
limitations began was a question of fact.1196  Therefore, the supreme
court reversed the lower court’s motion to dismiss and remanded
the case for further proceedings.1197
In In re Exxon Valdez Icicle Seafoods, Inc.,1198 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that an agreement to
“cede” back punitive damages was lawful and that the plaintiff was
not required to disclose the existence of such an agreement to the
jury determining punitive damages.1199  This case arose out of the
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.1200  Exxon reached a settlement agree-
ment with the “Seattle Seven” processors of seafood.1201  The set-
tlement did not release the processors’ claims against Exxon, but it
included an agreement to cede back to Exxon any punitive dam-
ages received.1202  However, because the jury determining the puni-
tive damages award was not told of this agreement between Exxon
and the Seattle Seven, the district court determined that the Seattle
Seven could not participate in the allocation of the punitive dam-
ages.1203  The court of appeals held that cede back agreements are
enforceable, because they encourage settlement in mass tort
cases.1204  In addition, such agreements should not be revealed to
the jury, because such disclosure would likely cause the jury to in-
flate the punitive damages assessed.1205 There were no special cir-
cumstances in the case to justify revealing the agreement to the
jury.1206  The district court improperly excluded the Seattle Seven
from the allocation plan.1207
In Parks Hiway Enterprises v. CEM Leasing, Inc.,1208 the su-
preme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judg-
ment against Parks Hiway on its strict liability, trespass, nuisance,
and negligence claims against the supplier of petroleum to an adja-
cent landowner whose underground tanks leaked, causing con-
1195. See id. at 980.
1196. See id. at 981.
1197. See id.
1198. 229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000).
1199. See id. at 800.
1200. See id. at 792.
1201. See id.
1202. See id.
1203. See id. at 795.
1204. See id. at 798.
1205. See id.
1206. See id. at 800.
1207. See id. at 800-01.
1208. 995 P.2d 657 (Alaska 2000).
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tamination.1209  The groundwater under the property of Parks Hi-
way was contaminated by fuel that leaked from underground stor-
age tanks owned by the Gold Hills Service Station.1210  Parks Hiway
sued the suppliers of the fuel, Petroleum Sales.1211  Because Petro-
leum Sales was not an “owner” or “person having control” of the
fuel, the “operator” of the facility from which the fuel leaked, nor
was it a “transporter,” as defined under Alaska Statutes section
46.03.822, the statute did not extend liability to Petroleum Sales for
contamination that occurred after the sale and delivery of the
fuel.1212  The court denied the trespass claim because Petroleum
Sales did not own or control the fuel when it leaked into the
groundwater and because it did not “set in motion a force which, in
the usual course of events, will damage property of another.”1213  In
addition, because Petroleum Sales did not own or control the fuel
or the tanks at the time of contamination, and was not a “substan-
tial factor” in creating the nuisance, it could not be held liable for
private nuisance.1214  Lastly, the court rejected Parks Hiway’s negli-
gence claim on the ground that, even if the duty to investigate the
tanks only requires constructive knowledge of the defective tanks,
Parks Hiway did not present sufficient evidence to create an issue
of fact on the duty element of negligence.1215
In Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,1216 the supreme court held that
the 1986 Tort Reform Act modified the definition of comparative
negligence in product liability lawsuits to include ordinary negli-
gence.1217  Smith was injured when a door on an air compressor
manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand fell on his head.1218  Smith filed a
product liability suit against Ingersoll-Rand, which argued that
Smith was comparatively negligent by failing to wear a hard hat
and by unsafely propping open the compressor door.1219  As a result,
the Federal District Court of Alaska certified to the supreme court
the question of whether ordinary negligence is considered com-
parative negligence in a product liability action.1220  Prior to the
1209. See id. at 668.
1210. See id. at 659.
1211. See id. at 659-60.
1212. Id. at 660-64.
1213. Id. at 664-65.
1214. See id. at 666-67.
1215. See id. at 667.
1216. 14 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000).
1217. See id. at 996.
1218. See id. at 990-91.
1219. See id. at 991.
1220. See id. at 992.
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1986 Act, comparative negligence was only allowed in product li-
ability cases where the plaintiff knew the product was defective but
unreasonably used it, and where the plaintiff misused the product,
proximately causing his own injuries.1221  However, the 1986 Tort
Reform Act defined fault in relation to comparative negligence as
“acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent, reckless or in-
tentional.”1222  Therefore, the court held that the Act expanded the
definition of comparative negligence in product liability actions to
include ordinary negligence.1223
In State v. Johnson,1224 the supreme court held that the State
only owed a “duty of reasonable care” to an inmate who was
knocked off a stairway landing.1225  Finding improper the superior
court’s jury instruction requiring the State to exercise the “utmost
caution,” the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.1226  Inmate Garry Johnson suffered serious in-
juries after being struck by a cell door and knocked off a stairway
landing.1227  Because Johnson “was not ‘in danger’ as contemplated
by the court in Wilson [v. City of Kotzebue1228], the situation did not
permit an instruction more stringent than reasonable and prudent
care under the circumstances.”1229  The court limited the issue on
remand to “whether the State was negligent in designing and
building the stairway to Johnson’s cell.”1230  Furthermore, it indi-
cated that the superior court should instruct the jury that a viola-
tion of the 1979 building code was evidence of negligence, not neg-
ligence per se.1231  The 1979 code, adopted before the State
correctional facility received its building permit, required stairway
landings to measure sixty inches, a foot longer than the landing in
front of Johnson’s cell.1232  However, prior to Johnson’s accident,
the State and City had adopted the 1991 building code, which only
required the landing to be forty-four inches.1233  Because the landing
complied with the 1991 code at the time of the accident, the court
found that the appropriate instructions should allow the jury either
1221. See id. at 993.
1222. Id. at 994.
1223. See id. at 996.
1224. 2 P.3d 56 (Alaska 2000).
1225. See id. at 61.
1226. See id. at 60-61.
1227. See id. at 58.
1228. 627 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1981).
1229. Johnson, 2 P.3d at 61.
1230. Id.
1231. See id. at 63.
1232. See id. at 58.
1233. See id. at 58-59.
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to accept or reject the 1979 code violation as evidence of negli-
gence.1234
In Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group,1235 the supreme
court reversed in part and affirmed in part summary judgment
granted to the defendants for claims arising out of a medical mal-
practice case.1236  Mrs. Trombley accused the defendants of operat-
ing on the wrong artery during a cardiac bypass and using veins
taken from the wrong leg.1237  Her husband joined suit, claiming loss
of consortium.1238  The court sustained summary judgment with re-
spect to Mr. Trombley’s claim, since Mrs. Trombley was married to
another man during the operation.1239  The court reversed summary
judgment against Mrs. Trombley, however, because the testimonies
of an expert witness and the defendant raised sufficient evidence of
an issue of material fact as to the claims of mistake, negligence, and
causation.1240
Jonathan M. Werner*
1234. See id. at 64.
1235. 3 P.3d 916 (Alaska 2000).
1236. See id. at 918.
1237. See id.
1238. See id.
1239. See id. at 923.
1240. See id. at 921.
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APPENDIX
CASES OMITTED FROM THE 2000 YEAR IN REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE
Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2000)
(denying Kozulin’s petition for review of a denial of his asylum
petition).
Prowler Partnership v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 242 F.3d
383 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that two vessels used by the National Marine Fisheries
Service to conduct a scientific research study were “scientific re-
search vessels” within the meaning of the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Cole v. Bartels, 4 P.3d 956 (Alaska 2000)
(affirming the superior court award of prejudgment interest on
the compensatory award and enhanced fees to the appellee).
Preblich v. Zorea, 996 P.2d 730 (Alaska 2000)
(holding that a plaintiff’s malpractice claim was barred because
the six-year statute of limitations had elapsed).
Hymes v. Alaska State Troopers, No. 00-35232, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24036, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 2000)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Hymes’ motion for reconsideration and dismissed his
action after Hymes failed to show clear error or present new evi-
dence).
Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 220 F.3d 1134
(9th Cir. 2000)
(dismissing a First Amendment challenge mounted by a group of
landlords in opposition to Alaska’s housing laws prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of marital status).
CRIMINAL LAW
State v. Blackmore, 2 P.3d 644 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that in the absence of legislative prohibition, the Alaska
Board of Game retains its common law power to enact regula-
tions declaring any violators strictly liable, so long as punish-
ments remain non-criminal).
Billy v. State, 5 P.3d 888 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
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(affirming Billy’s conviction and holding that Billy’s attorney’s
mistakes were not so egregious as to constitute ineffective coun-
sel).
Blank v. State, 3 P.3d 359 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(reversing Blank’s conviction because the portable breath test
administered to Blank by the police constituted an unauthorized
search).
Brown v. State, 12 P.3d 201 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming Brown’s sentence despite his argument that the state
missed the filing deadline for aggravating factors).
Cano v. Anchorage, No. A-7243, No. 4225, 2000 Alaska App.
LEXIS 80, at *1 (June 7, 2000)
(holding it was not an abuse of discretion for a lower court judge
to deny Cano, who was convicted of trespass, jury instructions on
necessity and waiver, and the opportunity to give the final argu-
ment in his capacity as co-counsel).
Carter v. State, No. A-7085, No. 4233, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS 85,
at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that a sexual assault victim’s identification of her assail-
ant while he was in handcuffs was not unreliable, and that the
composite sentence of forty-five years was not excessive).
Castle v. State, 999 P.2d 169 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the police stop that lead to the discovery of evi-
dence used to convict Castle was illegal).
Clark v. Anchorage, 2 P.3d 639 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(dismissing Clark’s appeal for want of jurisdiction).
Haruch v. State, No. A-7253, No. 4232, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
84, at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that the trial judge was not clearly mistaken when he
adjusted Haruch’s five-year presumptive sentence to twenty
years with ten years suspended because Haruch’s crime was a
“worst offense”).
Ivanoff v. State, 9 P.3d 294 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the record did not support a probable cause finding
for a search warrant for Ivanoff’s home).
Jensen v. State, No. A-7471, No. 4228, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
88, at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that Jensen may not appeal as excessive a judge’s sen-
tence pursuant to a plea agreement that doesn’t exceed that plea
agreement by two years).
Johnson v. State, No. A-7264, No. 4258, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
110, at *1 (August 9, 2000)
(holding that an arrest on an outstanding traffic warrant was not
a pretext to search the defendant, and that the officer’s discovery
of a crack pipe in the defendant’s pocket created sufficient prob-
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able cause to justify opening the defendant’s small box which
contained cocaine).
Kingsley v. State, 11 P.3d 1001 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the state showed Kingsley had control over his mo-
tor vehicle while intoxicated, and that the trial judge did not
need to instruct the jury on the issue of operability).
Malloy v. State, 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(affirming Malloy’s convictions but directing the superior court
to delete the restriction on her eligibility for discretionary pa-
role).
Markgraf v. State, 12 P.3d 197 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a lay witness may state in court that another person
seemed scared).
Morrison v. State, 7 P.3d 955 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(defining the proper procedure for sentencing when there is a
disagreement between a single-sentencing judge and a three-
judge sentencing panel).
Pierre v. State, No. A-7569, No. 4324, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS
202, at *1 (Dec. 20, 2000)
(holding that Pierre’s case needed to be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether it considered Pierre to be a statutory
“worst offender”).
Powell v. State, 12 P.2d 1187 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that letters written by Powell did not meet the elements
of the crimes of coercion or third-degree assault, reversing the
superior and district court’s judgments).
Schlagel v. State, 13 P.3d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the trial court erred when it held that Schlagel
failed to demonstrate the first in time defense).
Schoenthaler v. State, No. A-7101, No. 4236, 2000 Alaska App.
LEXIS 96, at *1 (June 28, 2000)
(reversing Schoenthaler’s conviction on the grounds that he was
arrested without probable cause, and that evidence obtained as a
result of the illegal arrest was admitted at trial).
Shewfelt v. Alaska, 228 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that Shewfelt’s absence during the replaying of his tes-
timony, although violative of the Sixth Amendment, was harm-
less error).
Wilson v. State, 12 P.3d 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that the trial court should have disclosed appropriate
parts of a search warrant application and in camera testimony to
Wilson, allowing Wilson to challenge the search warrant).
Wood v. State, A-7592, No. 4261, 2000 Alaska App. LEXIS 113, at
*1 (Aug. 9, 2000)
(holding that the trial court did not err when it imposed Wood’s
full suspended sentence after revoking his probation).
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Workman v. State, No. A-7357, No. 4230, 2000 Alaska App.
LEXIS 83, at *1 (June 21, 2000)
(holding that a composite sentence of four years and one month
for a defendant with four felony convictions and several misde-
meanor convictions was not excessive, given the totality of the
defendant’s conduct and record).
FAMILY LAW
Child Support Enforcement Division v. Maxwell, 6 P.3d 733
(Alaska 2000)
(holding that CSED denied Maxwell a fair and meaningful op-
portunity to deny its presumption of paternity).
